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reunification. The topic of Korean reunification, and the implications of such an event, however, have
largely been evaluated through the lens of case studies and are therefore limited in the quantitative
predictions surrounding reunification. The present study addresses this literature gap by investigating
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This research will use a most similar systems design case study to analyze the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL) and United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMIS/UNMISS). Drawing on data of SEA
accusations between 2007 and 2015, as well as analyzing gender training implementation, female high-
ranking positions, and gender divisions available within these two cases, this research examines SEA
through the lens of gender mainstreaming. Particularly, this article indicates that SEA lessens when 
gender mainstreaming is implemented and enforced and discusses how a peacekeeping mission, which
brings its own ideals and socializing practices, may promote the development and duration of SEA.
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is no statistically significant relationship between higher education in women and FLFPR. The second
main finding is that there is a statistically significant relationship between higher education in women 
and GDP per capita. The results imply that a good path forward in Bangladesh’s development may lie in
making more concentrated efforts to strengthen female tertiary education programs. 
 
 




             
          
          
           
       
             
            
         
       
        
   
      
  
   
 
 
           
          
              
             
 
             
  
 




       
           
              
          
        
       
          
        
           





Framing Bias and Identity Characteristics in the Portrayal of Terrorists in American News
Media 96
Saffeya Ahmed, VCU
A narrative of “Islamic terrorism” has risen globally and in the U.S. since the increase of terrorist attacks
following 9/11. With over 385 terrorism charges in the U.S. since 2001, these violent acts have run
rampant throughout the nation. Media in the form of print/online news, broadcast, radio, and podcasts
plays a major role in the representation of terrorist attacks to the general public. Of interest is to
explore apparent trends in media framing as news outlets cover terrorist attacks differently based on 
the identity of the perpetrator. The framing of an individual based on his or her identity, which is
composed of race, religion, or political ideology, feeds into creating a false narrative regarding these
specific identity characteristics. In order to analyze the portrayal of terrorists in the media based on 
their identities, this study conducts a two-pronged longitudinal content analysis following the New York
Times’ coverage of ten terrorist attacks occurring in the U.S. post-9/11. The study’s findings indicate
that a terrorist’s identity is significant in the framing of said individual; terrorists who are Muslim and/or
of non-Anglo-Saxon descent are framed in a more politicized and racialized manner than terrorists who
are non-Muslim and/or of Anglo-Saxon descent, who are framed in a more humanized manner.
The “Drone Memo” and the Targeted Killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi 118
Kevin Breiner, VCU
In 2011, the Obama administration employed a lethal drone strike against Anwar al-Aulaqi, both a US
citizen and known terrorist. The “drone memo,” authored by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal
Counsel, seeks to justify this drone strike as an appropriate use of wartime power by the Commander-
in-Chief. In doing so, the memo distorts the scope of presidential authority granted by the Constitution
and Congress, and ignores fundamental elements of Constitutional due process guarantees. To preserve
the constitutional integrity of all three branches of the federal government, judicial review must be
made available to the targets of overwhelming executive power.
The War on Drugs and the War on Race: The Relationship Between the Reagan
Administration’s Racial Sentiments and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 134
Maryum Elnasseh, VCU
The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world, which has deleterious effects on
those incarcerated and takes a toll on American taxpayers. There are significant racial disparities in
these rates, as people of color constitute over 60% of those incarcerated. In order to contextualize this
problem, sources such as congressional records, President Reagan’s rhetoric, statements from his
adviser, data from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, search warrants for narcotics, 
medical journals comparing physiological and psychological effects between crack and powder cocaine,
and media coverage of the “crack epidemic” were examined. These sources showed that, because of
Congress’s failure to fact-check the media hysteria regarding crack, law enforcement’s targeting of
Blacks at higher rates than Whites, and the subtly racist political sentiment apparent during the Reagan




      
        
    
 
       
               
          
 
 
          
         
            
  
 
          
         
 
         
        
 
 
        
           
        
         
  
 
      
        
 
 
           
         
        
          
       
         
 
 
         
         
           
        
        




Letter from the Department of Political Science 
The Department of Political Science at Virginia Commonwealth University is proud to
present Volume 3 of The Ramerican Political Science Review. This journal presents some of 
the best undergraduate work produced by students during the 2017-2018 academic year.
Political science students ask normatively important questions impacting politics at
home and abroad, and the six papers featured in this volume are examples of the extensive
research and the systematic investigations conducted in order to begin answering those
questions.  
This calendar year began with a Winter Olympics that saw North and South Korean
players skating together as one team; the historic event renewed interest in the prospect of 
Korean Reunification across the globe. Hayne Noh explores this possibility and asks what the
economic consequences of such an outcome might be.
Katilyn Thomas and Thomas Fratkin take an international perspective in looking at
issues facing women in the twenty-first century. Thomas’ article investigates whether the
promotion of gender equality can decrease instances of sexual abuse and exploitation by UN
peacekeepers abroad, while Fratkins’ article continues a long lineage of scholarly research
that studies the potential impact that gender equality concerning access to education might
have on a country’s economic development.
We shift our attention back home, focusing on the seventeen-year War on Terror, 
through the work of Saffeya Ahmed and Kevin Breiner. Ahmed’s article highlights biased
media framing of terrorist attacks based on the perpetrator’s identity, while Breiner’s
compels us to consider whether the increased scope of presidential authority when
conducting drone strikes has violated the U.S. Constitution.  
And Maryum Elnasseh evaluates archived sources and contemporary data to better 
contextualize accusations of intentional racial discrimination when Congress began waging
the War on Drugs. 
The questions political science students ask encompass a range of sub-fields and use a 
variety of theoretical approaches and political science methods. Ahmed’s article uses an
extensive longitudinal content analysis in order to test the hypothesis that media narratives
change depending on the identity of actors involved in terrorist schemes. Fratkin’s article
showcases the importance of quantitative methodology when conducting a regression
analysis of secondary data points, while Thomas’ article illustrates the pivotal nature of
qualitative methodology by adopting a case study approach.
We hope that these articles not only help to provide better understanding of relevant
questions concerning the state of our politics, domestically and abroad, but also that they
help inspire new questions for our readers. Furthermore, we hope that the work of this
volume’s researchers will encourage other students to conduct their own political science
research, and to submit it for consideration to The Ramerican Political Science Review next 
year, whether exploring American politics, international relations, comparative politics, public
policy or political theory.
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While the journal is supported by the Department of Political Science and the
contributions of our alumni, the final product is the work of a student editorial board that 
solicits and reviews manuscripts in a double-blind fashion. The researchers featured in this
issue went through a “revise and resubmit” process, wherein they made content and style
changes that were requested by the editorial staff.  The articles were then edited once more
by the editorial staff prior to publication. This final product is a testament to their immense
efforts during the summer months. The Department of Political Science would, therefore,
like to thank this year’s editorial board:
Madeline Doane, Class of 2020
Thomas Kipp, Class of 2019
Sneha Krish, Class of 2019
The Department of Political Science would also like to thank Dr. Alexandra Reckendorf
for advising our student editorial board as they worked through the process of critiquing
submissions and formatting this journal. 




        
  
       
     
     
  
     
              
  
     
           
  
        
     
           
     
  
        
           
  
           
    
     
           
     







this  historic  event  raises  the critical  question of  whether  Korean 
reunification is imminent and, if so, what economic results will come from 
reunification. The topic of Korean reunification, and the implications of such 
an event, however, have  largely been evaluated  through  the  lens of  case
studies and are therefore limited in the quantitative predictions surrounding
reunification. The  present  study addresses  this literature gap by 
investigating the predicted effects of peaceful reunification on the North and
South Korean economies using a forecasting model in SPSS to predict GDP
growth (%) following reunification. Results of the study suggest that South
Korea  will  likely  bear  a  heavy  monetary  burden  following  Korean
reunification,  while  North  Korea will benefit  from  the influx  of  welfare 
among  other  financial  advantages. Future  studies  may  consider  a





dominated  the media in  recent months.  At  the  start  of  2018, during  the
Pyeongchang Winter Olympics held in South Korea, North Korea announced
it would send athletes to the games in an amicable move that loosened years 
of diplomatic tensions. Not only did North Korea send athletes to the games,
but North and South Korea formed a joint women’s hockey team. Athletes
from both  Koreas walked  in  the Olympic  ceremony  under  a  unified, One















         
 
 
       
         
       
       





         
 
   
   
   







   
 
     
 
 
    
     
    
    
    
   
 
  
   
     
Hayne Noh




North  and South  Korea were  formed  following the ceasefire 
armistice agreement in 1953 after years of back and forth military combat. 
To  this  date,  an  official  peace  treaty  has  still  never  been  signed,  but  an
agreement has been made to work  towards an official end to  the Korean
War (Chan, 2018). As evidenced by the lack of the signing an official peace 




In the  weeks  following  the  Olympics, Kim  Jong Un  announced a
desire to meet with both South Korea’s and the United States’ presidents in
order to discuss diplomatic relations and denuclearization  in North Korea, 
paving the way for a new era of diplomacy between both the Koreas and the
United States. Despite the uncertainty of such a diplomatic summit, Kim Jong 
Un attended a South Korean K‐pop concert held in North Korea, much to the
surprise of South Korea and the rest of the world. Furthermore, in the days
following  the concert,  Kim Jong  Un  began meeting with  high‐level  South




&  Perlez,  2018).  At  the  summit,  Kim himself  suggested the possibility  of 










       
   
 
         
 
   







         
     
 
         
 






    
  
 
     
 
  
     






     
   
 
     
To What Extent Will Peaceful Korean Reunification Impact Both the North and South Korean 
Economies?
South  Korea will  be  joined  as  one  nation,”  paving  the way  for  a  new
relationship between the two Koreas (Chan, 2018). Such active diplomatic 









central government. The unification of North and South Korea’s distinctive 
cultures would be necessary for complete reunification. Economically,  the
two distinct market models of North  and South Korea would need  to  fall
under  one integrated market model,  combining the flow  of  GDP,  human
capital, and resources into one state. North Korea is marked by closed trade,
a small economy, and a comparatively poor economy. South Korea, on the
other  hand,  is  characterized  by  fairly  open  trade  policies,  a much  larger
economy,  and  a  stable GDP over  the  past  decade.  Although  political  and 
cultural factors are indeed important in deciding whether reunification will
be  feasible,  economic  determinants  may  have  ripple  effects  beyond  the
Korean economy.  
This  paper will  analyze  current literature surrounding the
ramifications of Korean reunification, specifically  focusing on monetary or
GDP considerations. The theoretical framework for the research question:
“To what extent will peaceful Korean reunification  impact both  the North 









the burd  en  of  reunification,  the  methodology used     will be ou   tli  ned, includi   ng  
a  justification  for  the  analytic  technique  and  forecasting  model utilized  i  n  the  
body of  the  paper.   Finally,  the expl   anation  of     results  and findings  will   
comprise  of   an  evaluation  of  the  study’s  limitations  and  potential 
directions for    future studies.  
 
     While integration implies the need for a cost‐benefit analysis before  finalizing  
  
reunification  agreements,  of  interest  is  the likelihood  of  
        
reunification in the first place. Scholars, such as Bruce 
W. Bennett in a report  titled, “Preparing for the Possibility of a
                 
North Korean Collapse”, asserted it  is rational to expect the collapse of 
  
North Korea’s government  in the near future by using the limited poverty  and  
           
famine data  available from  the  enigmatic  country  to support  their  assertion  
     
(2013).  As  one of  the  last  socialist systems of the Soviet era, or “Soviet‐like” 
                    
economies still standing, 
North Korea’s economic collapse becomes more likely as time passes, just as 
              
other Soviet era economies, like the USSR and China, have fallen one by one 
        
(Barna,  1998).  Although  the  possibility  of  military  force  to  achieve 
    
reunification is indeed possible, North Korea’s susceptibility to famine and 
     
overall economic instability serve as evidence for a growing body of experts 
      
who believe it is North Korea’s collapse or deterioration in
        
the foreseeable uture that would make Korean reunification more likely to occur 
(Bennett, 2013; Harvey, Kiessling, & Moeller, 2013; Noland, 2007) .Vast 
           
differences  exist  between   North  and   South  Korea  as  North  Korea  has  built  
    
its  market  infrastructure  on  self‐sufficiency,  while  South
 
Korea  has  developed  its model  on global  development  and international 
trade (Noland, 2007).  In the years following its policy reform, South  Korea 
 
 











             
       
   
 
       
     












   
    
  
   
 
 
       
    
  
 
    
   
     







saw an age of impressive GDP growth, while North Korea experienced famine
and the accumulation of debt to its socialist supporters like the Soviet Union 
and China (Noland, 2007). Moreover, several major world players have major 
interest  in  the  situation  unfolding in Korea,  including  the  United  States, 
China,  and  Russia,  due  to  trade  agreements  and business  partnerships,
suggesting  these  countries will  have  an influence  in any  agreements  and 
development  opportunities  that may  come  as a result  of  Korean
reunification  (Tkachenko, 2015). 
Much of the literature surrounding the topic of Korean integration 
has used German reunification as a case study, as several parallels have been 
drawn between  the unification of East and West Germany  in 1990  to  the
potential  impact  of  an  integration  in  North  and  South  Korea.  Just  as  the
unification of West and East Germany led to West Germany’s wealthier and
more globalized economy carrying the burden of East Germany’s economy, 
South Korea will  likely be required to do the same for North Korea (Blum, 
2001;  Estrada,  Park,  Ndoma,  &  Kim,  2015;  Song,  2003).  Since  the  gap
between North  and South  Korea’s  economy and development  is  so 
extensive, the cost of reunification in Korea is estimated to exceed the cost 
of Germany’s 2 trillion‐euro reunification by  close  to double  that  amount
(Mun & Yoo, 2012).  The  towering  fiscal burden would  likely  fall on South
Korea or otherwise require aid and investments from foreign nations (Choi, 
Merrill, Yang, & Chang, 2001.). 
Similarly  to  German  reunification,  Korea’s  reunification  will  be 
heavily  influenced  by  the United  States,  Russia,  and  China. Russia  in 
particular, following the 2014 Ukrainian conflict with the United States, has
turned its attention to maintaining the “status quo” in the Korean peninsula

















   
 
  






(Tkachenko, 2015).  In  fact,  it has been suggested that the  topic of Korean 
reunification is reminiscent of the power struggle that existed between the











the   uncertainty   over  the   costs   and   benefits   of  reunification  serves  as   a  
significant  barrier. Using a  computable  general equilibrium (CGE) to model  
the  integration between the Koreas, Noland et  al.  suggested  in  a study titled,  
“Modeling   Korean  unification”,  that  product  market  integration  would 
largely  reduce  famine   costs  in  North  Korea,  while  having  an  insignificant  
impact  on  South  Korea  in  terms  of   potential  monetary  gains  (2000).  
However,  recent   investigations  contradicting   the notion  that   reunification  
will be  inconsequential to  South Korea,  have been  suggested. For example,  
Cheong asserted  that integration may lead to  benefits for the  South Korean  
economy   through  the  increase  in  the  availability of  North Korea’s natural  
resources, such as  North Korea’s largely untouched mineral wealth (2015). 
To further  complicate the potential  situation that  will unfold in the event of  




















   
 
 
   
    
   
   
  
 











considering current circumstances,  occur through  peaceful means. 
Accounting for  current events,  past  literature  results,  and  historical
applications, reunification  is  a  possibility  in  Korea’s  future. With  this
possibility  in  mind,  the need  to  consider  the  implications of  Korean 
reunification will be of particular utility  to North and South Korea as they 
evaluate  the potential outcomes  of  reunification on  their respective
economies. The second section of the theoretical framework will discuss the 




between  two   formerly  distinct  states  into  one  internationally  recognized  
entity. Korean reunification implies  that Korea would be fully  economically 
integrated,   politically   under  one   national  government,   and  function   as  a  
single  country or  state  to  the extent  that was present before  the Korean  
division at the 38th parallel. The  ideal  standards of reunification would occur  
through peaceful means, either through  negotiation  or treaty, and  without 
the use of military force to damage or  deter  the other side, as this  method  
of reunification would  accrue the  lowest additional cost. Not only would  a  
peaceful form of reunification be  less costly compared to waging war, but it 











             
  
 










             
   








   
  
       
 
 





    
   
  
   
   
       
  
     
   
Hayne Noh
behavior compared to its historically hostile nature. The immediate impact 
on the economy will be determined by the amount of predicted GDP growth, 
stagnation, or decrease, using South Korea’s current GDP numbers as  the 
baseline figures projected to 2030. This will be done in order to accurately
assess  the  immediate  impact  following disruption  of  both  the  North and 
South  Korean  economies,  if  reunification  were  to  occur  in 2018.  Due to
North  Korea’s  secrecy  and the  difficulty  in  obtaining  accurately reported 
datas,  improvements made  in GDP growth  will be compared to South 
Korea’s current status.
The Possibility of Korean Reunification 
Because  Korean  reunification  entails  the  integration  of  political,
cultural,  and  economic  factors,  reunification could occur under favorable 
political, cultural, and economic conditions. When North and South Korea
were partitioned in 1945, the intention was to one day be reunified, as only 
a  ceasefire  agreement  was  signed.  While  the  desire  to  be  reunified  has
prevailed since the division, obstacles to reunification often came in the form
of North Korea’s hostility and a lack of continuous communication between 
the  two  sides.  In  addition,  a  lack of  urgency has  prevented major  strides
towards  Korean  reunification. However,  current  events point  to  both  an
increasing  urgency to  reunify,  a  decrease  in  North  Korea’s  hostility, and 
increased  communication not  only with North  and  South  Korea, but  also
major foreign players such as the United States.  
Politically speaking, North Korea’s autocratic ruler, Kim Jong Un, has
made recent attempts to establish intentional diplomacy with South Korea
and the United States, by extending open  invitations to continue meeting
with each nation’s leader within the next year. In fact, Kim Jong Un stated in 







         
     









               
     
         
     





   
 
  
     
   




   




        
   
     
   










treaty officially ending  the Korean War in  the months  following a summit 
that was held  in April, 2018 (Lee, 2018). Although an official peace treaty
ending the war has yet to be signed, North and South Korean  leaders are
currently  discussing  their intentions  to  pursue  permanent  peace  on  the
Korean Peninsula. 
Although  North  Korea  has  strict  control  over  media  and the
information  flow  into  the  country,  some  forms  of  foreign  media  have 
penetrated the closed‐off country. This influx of information suggests that
as  time moves  forward,  North Korean  propaganda  techniques  and
government media  may have  a  weaker  influence on  their North Korean 
civilian audience. South Korea’s political arena has recently experienced a
bout of political corruption, which consequently led to public disinterest. For
example,  South Korea’s  former president,  Park Geun‐hye, was ousted  for
due to abuse  of power,  corruption, and bribery.  Since there has  been  a
longstanding interest in reunification since the war, South Korean politicians
have now set their gaze on reunification as a method to win public favor, as 
is  the case with  South  Korea’s  current  President, Moon  Jae‐in. President
Moon’s personal  connection  to Korean reunification is evident  in his own 
upbringing, in  addition to his stance on  reunification. Moon himself  was 
separated from relatives as his parents were North Korean refugees who fled
to  the  South  because  of  the  Korean war  (Rogin,  2017).  Moon’s  story






         
       
 
 
       
   



















     
    
 
 
    
  
       
   
   
  
 








     
  




A significant portion of the literature reviewed suggests that North
and  South Korean  reunification is  not  only possible,  but also  imminent 
(Barna,  1998;  Bennett,  2013;  Harvey,  Kiessling, & Moeller,  2013; Noland,
2007).  However,  scholars  have  also  offered  an  opposing  view  to  Korean 
reunification,  suggesting  that North  Korea will  remain  in  its  current  state
until dramatic  military  force  or provocation  leads  North  Korea  to be
overtaken by their allies. Questions  linger as to why North Korean leader, 
Kim Jong Un, has suddenly attempted to form diplomatic ties with the U.S.
and South Korea. It is shocking, both economically and politically, that North
Korea has sustained itself for as long as it has (Koh, 2012). Almost no other
Soviet‐like  regime  still  stands  today, with the  exception  of North  Korea’s 
unexpected  endurance  (Barna,  1998).  The  two  major  Soviet  era
powerhouses, the former USSR and China, which are also the two states that
should  have  had  enough  prowess  in order  to  sustain  themselves,  have
drastically  altered  their market  models  to  adapt  to  the  ever‐globalizing 
marketplace, while North Korea’s isolationist model has remained stagnant
for decades. Secondly, North Korea’s prolonged sustainment has come not
without  a  price.  Famine  stricken areas  in  North  Korea  have become 
commonplace and support from Russia and China, North Korea’s two closest 
allies,  has  become  scarce  (Magid,  2000).  The  role  of foreign  aid  in North 
Korea has, in part, contributed to its prolonged sustainment, but Russia and
China’s oversight  in North Korea has decreased rapidly  in recent years.  In 













       
   
     




       













    
  
   
   
   
    
  
   
      
  
  
   
    
    
   
 
  
   
   





isolationist  policies,  who lack  knowledge  and  information,  may  be left 
behind in terms of technological advancements.  
The  likelihood of a North Korean regime collapse, paired with  the 
country’s  poor  financial situation,  makes  the conditions for  peaceful
reunification optimal. The total cost of reunification will differ based on the
events  leading to reunification  itself. Potential outcomes  include full‐scale
war  between  North  and  South  Korea,  military  takeover  by one  side, or
peaceful reunification in which neither side uses military force  in order to 
negotiate terms of reunification. Under current circumstances, North Korea
is unable  to  fund a  sustained war against South Korea, particularly in the 
wake of scarce foreign aid. North Korea’s GDP falls at around $40 billion GDP
(power purchasing  parity)  and ranks at  118 in the  world (“The  World 
Factbook”),  far  from  South  Korea  and  its  closest  ally,  the United States, 
which both consistently appear in the top 15 economies in the world. South 
Korea would not be the  first  to provoke military  conflict because of their 
legitimacy, in the same vein as to why the United States would not instigate
a  nuclear  attack  in  North Korea  unless first  provoked  by  the other  side.
Scholars have suggested that peaceful reunification will be the most likely
outcome,  particularly  in  the  event  of  North  Korea’s  collapse  and  South
Korea’s  assumption  of  responsibility  or an  extended  negotiation  process
without the use of coercive military force on either side (Garrett & Glaser, 
1995).  A lack  of  clarity exists  on  the mechanism  through which  peaceful
reunification  will  occur.  Whether reunification  will  occur through  North
Korean  collapse  or  diplomacy  and  negotiation  between  the two  sides  is 
















       
 
       






   
  




   




    
 
    






The  evidence points  to the likelihood  of  reunification  in  Korea’s 
future, with North Korea’s collapse a plausible and reasonable outcome. It is
imperative to  consider the  potential economic  implications  of  Korean 
reunification  and  whether  these  impacts  could  incentivize  or  deter
reunification from occurring. From a rationalist perspective, positive gains
from reunification will  incentivize the Koreas to reunify, while clear  losses 
with  little  benefit  from reunification may  offset  the  course  to reunify. 
Although economic factors alone cannot fully explain the intent to reunify, 
and political and cultural variables will certainly play a role, economic factors 
will  undoubtedly  be  discussed  during  any  reunification  agreement  or 
negotiation.
Economic Costs and Benefits of  Reunification  
The major barrier  to  a  reunified Korea is  cost.  Reunification  is  an





majority  of  financial cost  on  the state  that  had the  means  to  pay  for
reunification. Predictions regarding Korean unification have suggested the
Korean reunification cost will likely exceed Germany’s cost by nearly twice 
the  amount  ,  even  after  the  cost was  adjusted for  inflation,  because  the 
difference between North and South Korea is significantly greater than that 









       
 
 
















       
     





    
 
 





      
  
   
  
  





   
    
   




comes  from  the  cost  of  building  new infrastructure,  such  as  highways,
buildings,  and  transit  systems  connecting  the two  formerly  separated 
countries. The  raw materials,  human capital,  and  oversight  into  these
endeavors will be expensive. Another cost will stem from the provision of 
aid  and  welfare  to  North  Korea’s  undernourished  and impoverished 
population. In  addition,  there  will be the added  cost  of  integrating  the
formerly separated government structures. With no clear reunification plan 
presently  in place,  the cost  of  combining  or  equitably  partitioning 
government roles and positions will also need to be considered.
The primary  issue that will need  to be confronted  in  the event of 
reunification is that North Korea does not have substantial financial capital,





or  developed  (Vokina  et  al.,  2016).  Under  this  classification  system,  the 
North Korean economy is considered underdeveloped, while South Korea,
as the world’s 11th largest economy in terms of nominal GDP (“Rankings”),
is  considered  economically  developed.  Furthermore,  the  World  Bank
categorizes North Korea as  low  income while categorizing South Korea as 
high income (“Databank”). The two Koreas are not simply different, but fall
on complete opposite sides of the development and wealth spectrums. The
longitudinal GDP of North Korea is largely unknown, as the country does not
regularly  release  information  regarding their  economy,  and when data  is
released, the data’s validity is often called into question. On the other hand,
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(“Databank”),  has  been  fairly  stable  since  the  1990s.  This  stability  is
extremely  important,  as  it  may  offset an  unsteady transition  during  the




South Korean officials would need to account for the benefits and
costs of reunification if, andwhen it happens, by creating a reunification plan
to  ensure  the  best  possible  outcome for  both  North  and  South  Korea. 
Benefits  of  proposed  reunification,  for  South Korea  in  particular,  are 
potential GDP growth, access to natural  resources and undeveloped  land, 
and an influx of human capital from North Korea. South Korea’s GDP growth





is  a  familiar problem  to South Korea. In addition,  the combination of  the
working  population  will benefit  both  Koreas,  as  there  are more  people
available  to build  the  infrastructure and government institutions required
for reunification.  
South Korea will have to lead the charge to properly integrate the 
two Koreas because North Korea, under the presumed circumstances, does
not  have the  means  to do  so.  Therefore,  South  Korea  will  pay  for  the 
development of infrastructure and programs that target mass welfare and 
aid  to North  Korean  civilians.  The  human  capital  required  to mend two




           














             
   
   






      
    
 
   
   
 
   
  
  
     




       
 
  
     
  





these benefits  outweigh the  projected costs,  while excluding extraneous




One  such  benefit  is  that the  area  formerly  known  as  North  Korea, when 
integrated, may  assume  a  “developed”  or,  at minimum,  a  “developing”




previously  (Vokina et  al.,  2016).  Secondly,  the  transfer of  technology  and 
globalization that will influx into the former North Korea in a manner unseen 
in the country since its conception, may have a positive impact on the overall
integrated Korean  economy.  As  a result  of  globalization,  another  benefit
would  be  free  access  to  this  technology  that  will  help advance  the
development of North Korea. Finally, as South Korea would likely move to 
develop land in North Korea and urbanize the area much like itself, it would 
first need to address  the issue of  famine and poverty before  it  is able to
assume the land for new business endeavors.    
In these circumstances, North Korea would  have to make significant 
sacrifices in terms of political oversight  into the economy, especially  in an 
increasingly globalized economy. South Korea historically certainly has the
upper hand in successfully developing an economy. However, the monetary






           
   
   
       
   
       
   
     









             




      
  
  
    
  
    
  
   







   
       




these businesses are unable to transition from an isolationist to a globalized
model, they will likely be unable to compete with South Korean companies
and the influx of foreign corporations. However, direct economic difficulties
for North Korea will largely rest on the reunification plan itself, which has yet
to  be  conceived.  Lack  of evidence  prevents  the  extrapolation  of  North
Korea’s costs without a set reunification plan, and therefore, unlike South
Korea’s  costs,  the  expense  cannot  be  predicted.  Such  a subject  is  more
appropriately addressed  in a discussion  of  the  long‐term,  rather  than 
immediate, impacts of Korean reunification. 
Hypothesis 
Under the presumed peaceful reunification circumstances, evidence
that suggests the benefits following reunification would outweigh the costs 
for South Korea is lacking, although the benefits of reunification for North 
Korea’s  economic  status  are  relatively  abundant.  Therefore,  it  is






United  States  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA), and  the  Organization  for
Economic Cooperation and Development  (OECD). The datasets used were 
gathered from globally available sources for their accuracy and reliability as
widely recognized international  entities. GDP growth (%)  for South Korea








       
 




















   
   
    
 







    
   
 
   
  
   









regarding market growth, South Korea’s baseline data for GDP growth (%) 
was used. No primary data was collected by the researcher.
Variables of  Interest 
The  outcome  variable  in this  study  was  GDP  (%)  growth  of  the 




would  alter the  GDP  growth  (%)  of  South  Korea,  assuming  reunification
occurs within the year 2018.  
Several predictor variables were used in order to account for factors 
that  may  impact  GDP  growth  of  Korea  following  reunification.  Among  a
multitude of factors, the size of the country’s population or human capital,
the availability of natural resources owned and used by the state, and the 
current GDP growth (%) were used as predictors for future GDP growth (%).
The study considered North and South Korea’s current working population, 
aged 15‐65 (WBO, 2017), as well as South Korea’s Total Domestic Extraction
Used (OECD, 2018), as a measure of the natural resources available and used





Data  were  projected  until  the  year  2030,  in  order  to  assess  the
immediate  effects  of  reunification  following  the  anticipated  immediate






         










             
 
   
       
           
           
   




     









       
 
  
    
      
      
  




forecasting model accounted for the  predictor variables  of  working 
population size in North and South Korea and natural resource use in South 
Korea and allowed the extrapolation of baseline data to project the Korean 
GDP growth  in  years  following  reunification. A null model was  created  in
order to assess the results of Korean reunification without accounting for the
predicted cost of reunification. The null model would suggest a “best” case 







Table 1. depicts the projected GDP growth (%) of a reunified Korea
from 2017  to  2030. Model  1 was  conceived using  the Brown  Forecasting 




that the  GDP  growth (%)  of  a  reunified  Korea would  visibly  decrease
compared to the baseline GDP growth (%) of South Korea from 1961‐2016. 
The final GDP growth (%) in 2030 was predicted to be 0.29%, whereas South
Korea’s  current  GDP  growth  (%)  is  around  2.80%. The  forecasting model





         
 










             
   
     
       
 
         






     
 
      
  
 
   
 





       
  
   
    
 
     






would experience a 2.51% decrease  in GDP growth over the 14‐year span 
after reunification. 
Although  a GDP  growth decrease  of 2.51%  may  seem  small, or
tolerable  for  an established economy,  South Korea’s GDP growth  (%) has
been relatively stable throughout the 2000s, fluctuating only once as a result
of the 2008 world financial crisis. This stability is a sign of a robust, developed





reunification,  South  Korea’s  GDP  growth  (%)  is  projected  to steadily
decrease.
Discussion  
Given  the  analysis,  South  Korea’s GDP growth (%)  is  projected  to 
significantly  decrease  in  the  years  following  Korean  reunification. 
Considering the cost of reunification as well as  the benefits to both North
and South Korea,  it  is  clear  that  South Korea will  benefit  less  than North
Korea  economically.  Therefore,  assuming  South  Korea  will  act  rationally, 
South  Korea  will  not  agree  to reunification  terms for  economic  reasons
because the costs of reunification would far outweigh the benefits.  
Model 1 of the analyses was a prediction of the “best” case scenario 
for  South Korea.  Even  in a null model, in  which  South  Korea  would  not 
personally  bear  any of  the costs of  reunification,  it  is clear  that  the
reunification event  itself would potentially decrease  the GDP growth  (%). 
Since  it  is more  realistic  that South Korea would bear  the majority of  the 




       
 
       
   




             
 
       
       
         





       





    
 
    
  
       
  
   
       
 
    
    
     
     
   
  
  
   
    
    




decrease  than  predicted  in  the  model.  Although  benefits,  such  as  the 
increase in total working population and the influx of natural resources may 
help buffer  the negative  impacts,  the results suggest the GDP growth will 
likely experience long term decrease before these benefits may take place. 
Thus, South Korea would be dissuaded from pursuing reunification purely




the  sake  of  a  reunification  agreement.  In  addition  to  certain  economic 
factors, theremay be political or cultural considerations not discussed within
the scope of this  study that may outweigh economic cost and incentivize
South  Korea  to  reunify with North  Korea.  For  example,  in  the  event  of  a
North  Korean  government  collapse  or overthrow of  the dominant  party,
South Korea may see a cultural responsibility to intercede. Likewise, in the
event  of  North  Korean  regime collapse  or a peaceful reunification
agreement,  it  is also  possible  that  Korean  political leaders may seek  an
opportunistic movement  to  reunify  in order  to  gain  public  support  for
themselves and eliminate  some of  the public distrust of  the government,
particularly  in  an  era where  government  corruption  and  public
disillusionment is high. Reuniting families, a moral sense of responsibility, or 
political  victories  are  among the many  political  and  cultural  reasons why
South Korea may  still  opt  for  reunification  in  spite  of  the  fiscal burden.
Therefore,  although  South  Korea may  be dissuaded  from pursuing
reunification with North Korea,  there may be cultural  or  political  factors, 





































































































































   
 

































































































































































































       
     


















       
   
 
   
   
    
   
     
  
   
   
 
   
  





    
 




    





The  sexual  exploitation and  abuse (SEA)  of  host  communities by  UN 
peacekeepers is a type of post‐war violence that has been growing over the
years. SEA is an important issue in many peacekeeping missions and it has
defined UN peacekeeping for a while. Thus, this article considers whether 
gender mainstreaming, the  approach of  promoting  gender equality  to
troops, can decrease the amount of SEA. This research will use a most similar
systems design case study to analyze the United Nations Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL)  and United Nations  Mission  in  South  Sudan  (UNMIS/UNMISS).
Drawing  on  data  of  SEA  accusations  between  2007  and  2015,  as  well  as 
analyzing  gender  training implementation,  female  high‐ranking  positions, 
and  gender divisions  available  within  these  two cases,  this research 
examines SEA through the lens of gender mainstreaming. Particularly, this
article  indicates  that  SEA  lessens when gender  mainstreaming is
implemented  and  enforced and  discusses  how  a  peacekeeping mission, 




around  the  world  since  1948  (The  UN  2016).  In  the  initial  years, 
peacekeeping  missions  were  mainly deployed  to  help  solidify  peace
agreements  and  utilize political resources  to  settle warfare  in  a  peaceful
way. Yet, the limelight has now turned towards the unexpected side effects
of peacekeeping  (Nordas and Rustad 2012).  The earliest  reported  case of
sexual exploitation and abuse enacted by UN peacekeepers was throughout
the United Nations  Mission  in  Liberia  mission  in  Cambodia  in  1992 
(Whitworth, 2004). Statements started to emerge that UN peacekeepers had 
taken part in sexual violence and the rise of prostitution (Whitworth, 2004).
32
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Local  residents  also  started to complain  about the  growth of  sexually
transmitted diseases (STDs) as UN peacekeepers vacationed in Thailand and 
came back with HIV and other infections, which circulated across the local 
communities (Martin, 2005). The UN hospital administered to roughly 5000
occurrences of  STDs  within  the  mission  (Martin, 2005).  In  Kosovo,  East 
Timor, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslavia,  the emergence of
UN  peacekeepers  coexisted  with  the emergence of  sex  trafficking  and
brothels  almost  immediately.  In each  of  these  missions,  it  is  UN 
peacekeepers that participated in trafficking and establishing brothels from
which UN Peacekeepers  made  a profit  (Allred, 2006;  Vandenberg,  2005; 
Koyama & Myrtinnen, 2007). 





United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted the approach of gender 
mainstreaming, which  advocates  for gender equality  and the inserting  of
women,  as  well  as  men, in  all  realms of  peacekeeping  operations  (UN
gender,  2016).  In  2003,  the  United  Nations  enforced  a pledge  to  a  zero
tolerance policy for SEA written by the Secretary‐General (Kanetake, 2010). 
The Secretary‐General assured that all peacekeepers found responsible of
SEA would  be dismissed and  penalized promptly. This  pledge came  after
social shock that many UN peacekeepers that had been found responsible of 
sexual  misconduct  were  frequently  given  a small reprimand and  then
brought back to active duty in the peacekeeping mission (Kanetake, 2010). 
Even  then, it  was  not  until  2005  that  the  Department  of  Peacekeeping 
33
 
           
   
 






       
           
       











      
  
 
    
 




    
      
    
    
   
 
   
   
  
   
  
  
   
The Impact of Gender Mainstreaming on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers
Operations installed the Conduct and Discipline Team, and began to instruct
the  peacekeepers  to  conform  to  the new protocol  (Karim and  Beardsley, 
2016). 
This  research will  focus on assessing how the approach of gender 
mainstreaming has functioned in preventing SEA. The theoretical argument 
of this analysis implies a history of the subjugation of women through the




will help build awareness and insight among the peacekeepers, which would
potentially shift the masculine culture and lessen SEA. The research will be
conducted by analyzing how UN peacekeeping mission  in Liberia (UNMIL)
and  Sudan/South  Sudan (UNMIS/UNMISS) have implemented  gender









which relates to  the perception of women  in  traditional cultures as being
men’s possessions. Norman Naimark, author of ‘The Russians in Germany,’ 




       




       





         
   
 
         
     
       
     
     




    




    
    
  
   
  
   
     
  
 
     
   
    
   





“theoretical castration of men who couldn’t protect their women” (1995). 
This is a perpetuation of Brownmiller’s argument that “the body of a raped 
woman  becomes  a  ceremonial  battlefield”  (1975).  As  the  battleground,
women are used as a platform for soldiers to attack and discipline enemy 
combatants  (Secretary‐General,  2006).  Thus,  SEA,  in  the  framework  of 
security  organizations,  may  be  a crucial  manifestation  of  militarized 
masculinity, an aggressive form of masculinity needed for warrior culture to
flourish (Enloe, 1990). SEA is common in military establishments because the
military’s administrative design  is split based on gender (division of  labor)




and Ferrum College, mention that productive combat demands the warrant 
of  hegemonic masculinities,  combativeness,  conformity,  stoicism,  and
allegiance over feminine behavior (2010). 
Some  feminist  scholars,  such  as  Cynthia  Enloe  (2000)  and  Sandra
Whitworth (2004) argue that masculinity of male soldiers adjusts throughout 
their training course,  conceiving  a specific  character they  call  “militarized
masculinity.” “Militarized  masculinity”  is  a  mixture of  characteristics and 
attitudes  that are hyper‐masculine, hegemonic,  and  linked  mostly  with
military soldiers. Whitworth contends that militaries are acknowledged for 
promising  to  “make men  out  of  soldiers”  and  she  conveys that  people
associate  the military with being able  to  instill manhood, while  soldiering 








       
   
           
       
   
         
               
   





       
             
 









    
  
      
    
  
     
        
  
     
   
  
 
   
    
       
 
    
   
 
   
  




and  hegemonic  portrayals  of  masculinity. She analyzes hegemonic
illustrations of masculinity within the military,  including dehumanizing the 
“enemy,”  in order  to  become  emotionally  ready  to  defeat  the opponent 
during  war (2004). Whitworth  argues that  in order  to  dehumanize the
enemy, one must first defeat the “other” within themselves. She states that
dehumanizing the “other” expressed as “feminine” becomes threatening, as 
it can lead to violence outside the domain of military combat, such as sexual 
exploitation and abuse of women (2004). In times of battle, women face a 
heightened risk to their safety, partly because they are “othered” through
their gender and  cultural  identities  (Whitworth, 2004).  The  belief that
soldiers deserve sexual encounters with women correlates with militarized 
masculinity. In  addition  to  the general  association  between  militarized 
masculinity and SEA within war and military institutions, an additional link 
applies to peacekeeping forces.  
With  the expansion  of more  intricate  peacekeeping  operations,
soldiers are asked to do work that had previously been done by civilians. For
example, soldiers may be asked to advocate for human rights or coordinate
elections  during  peacekeeping  operations  (UN  duties,  2016).  Soldiers  are
predicted to do what some consider to be everyday work that might lead to
‘identity crises’, which are demonstrated  in sexual exploitation and abuse
(Carreiras, 2010). Whitworth (2004) states that when soldiers are incapable
of  achieving their  duty  as  soldiers  trained  for  combat,  they may  turn  to
sexual  exploitation  or  violence against  the local  population,  sexual 







         
 







         
         
   
   




       
   




     
 
    
  
   
 
  
   
  
     
     
  
  




    
  




Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Operations,’ has implied that a ‘hyper‐masculine’
society that stimulates tolerance for severe sexual attitudes has increased 
within  peacekeeping  missions  (2005).  Indeed,  the  military  (and 
peacekeeping operations) has brushed off misconduct as normal for a male‐
oriented establishment. For instance, in Cambodia,  in the early 1990s, the 
UN  Special  Representative  of  the Secretary‐General,  Yasushi  Akashi,
acknowledged worries  about  sexual misconduct  by  UN  peacekeepers  to
NGOs by saying, “boys will be boys” (Simm, 2013).
In spite of the UN’s zero tolerance policy and clear notice against SEA 
by  peacekeepers,  it  is  still  a  crucial  issue  during  peacekeeping  missions. 
There continues to be an immense level of transactional sex that could be 
seen  as  an  exchange of  gifts,  favors,  or  money  for  sex,  between
peacekeepers  and  regional  women. Thus,  when men participate in
transactional sex,  they may be more likely  to  enact  sexual  abuse or  rape
(Dunkle et al., 2006). Nordås and Rustad, authors of “Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse by Peacekeepers: Understanding Variation,”  introduced the earliest
statistical study  that  examines  the problem of  what  can account  for
fluctuations in recorded SEA within peacekeeping operations. Their analysis
suggests that SEA is more common in larger missions, in less developed host 
countries,  and  in  conflicts with  fewer  battle‐related  deaths  (Nordås  and 
Rustad 2013). 
This  paper  seeks  to  discover  a  way to  alleviate SEA related to 
diminishing patriarchal ideals and militarized masculinity by investigating the











         

















   
  
  
   
  
   
 
     
    
  
   
  
  












mainstreaming has mainly been studied in relation to the increase of female 
peacekeepers and involving women in peace operations. UN officials have 
indicated that adding female peacekeepers may have an impact in lowering 
SEA (Bridges and Horsfalls, 2009). This approach to weakening SEA offenses, 




Despite the significance of  adding more women to  peacekeeping 
operations, it cannot be concluded that increasing the amount of women is
an acceptable solution to SEA. Firstly, as Johanna Valenius,  author of “A Few
Kind Women:  Gender Essentialism and  Nordic Peacekeeping  Operation,” 
asserts that since peacekeeping personnel currently have growing contact
with  the  local  communities,  there  is  an  increasing urgency  for awareness





throughout the paper and then a clarification of how gender mainstreaming
is  thought  to affect  SEA  perpetuated  by  peacekeepers.  The  correlation  is
made  clear  with  the  following  theories:  the feminist  theory,  militarized
masculinity,  and  group culture. Researchers  like  Martin  (2005)  have 


















           
         
 
     
         





   
      
  
 








      
     
 
   
     
      
 




for  sexual purposes,  including, but not  limited to,  profiting monetarily,
socially, or politically from the sexual exploitation of another” (SGB, 2003). 
Sexual abuse details “the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual 
nature, whether  by  force or  under  unequal  or  coercive  conditions”  (SGB, 
2003). 
A possible solution would be establishing gender equality, or Gender
Mainstreaming,  within these  masculine  spaces,  thus  creating a  path  to 
lessen SEA. Gender Mainstreaming is an approach that was enacted in 2001 
by the United Nations Economic and Social Council to guarantee that gender
viewpoint  is acknowledged  in all  work  (UN  gender,  2016). While
peacekeeping  operations are  comprised  of  a  mixture  of  state militaries, 
Whitworth  admits  that  each military  has  a  shared  commonality  between 
masculine  systems  (2004).  Presently, peacekeeping  camps  are  masculine
territories.  The  camps  are  ruled  by men  and,  more  accurately,  are 
surrounded by  a militaristic  kind of masculinity. Although this militaristic 





in which the women of the population are challenged with ideals dictating
that they are, by some means, inferior than men, and thus, not given equal
opportunities. For this reason, women are seen as lesser. By examining the
SEA  through  a  liberal  feminist  theory,  the injustices in  UN peacekeeping 




       
 
             
   




           
 
   
       
 
         
   
 








    
 
       
  




      
 
  
    
 
     
  
 
    




   
 
The Impact of Gender Mainstreaming on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers
community are challenged with,  like rape and forced prostitution, display 
how women are  subjected  to  an  inferior  role.  The  liberal  feminist  theory 
additionally mentions that women’s subordination is grounded in legalized
restraints that limit women’s access to success (Mudzingwa, 2013). Many of 
the undeveloped countries where UN peacekeeping operations have been 
occupied have  transmitted  female  subordination  as  a  “traditional”  family 
quality and adopted them as justifications to forbid women from advancing 
in the society.  
The  militarized  masculinity  theory,  coined  by  Sandra  Whitworth,
asserts  that  the masculine roles and beliefs  instilled on young men in the 
military;  characterizing  some  of  the most  combative,  prejudiced,  and 
destructive  elements  of  men,  are  to  blame  for  offensive  conduct during
peacekeeping missions (2004). Many feminist theorists consider the rise of
hyper‐masculine  characteristics  in  the  military  as  the  prime  perpetrator
surrounding  repeating  abuse  in  peacekeeping  missions  (Lopes  2013,  5). 




This creation of a warrior, prepared to attack on demand, helps men endure
war  and  brutal  combat,  but  can quickly  turn  to  extreme  and entitled
attitudes outside those military circumstances (Lopes, 2013).  
Military  institutions  are hierarchical and  possess  a  rigid  chain  of 
command. In 2005, the UN announced an extensive release by Prince Zeid
Ra‟ad Al Hussein, prior UN peacekeeper, who examined and implemented





         
           
 





       
   











     
      
 




   
    
  




     
 





issue of  sexual  exploitation during  a peacekeeping mission. Yet,  in Prince




altering their statement, intimidate investigators  and withhold  naming
accused  persons  (Prince,  2005).  One  female  soldier,  characterizing  her
involvement with a mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, states that once she 
found out that trafficking by UN soldiers had become rampant, she tried to
warn  the  appropriate  authorities (Bolkovac  and  Lynn,  2011).  Her officer
instantly lowered her in rank and the whole unit tried to vilify her (Bolkovac 
and Lynn, 2011).  
Inside  the framework  of a  peacekeeping mission,  there is  no 
supervision of units of troops and, frequently, a state will note an absence
of  proof when  challenged about  the lack  of any  evidence  (Aoláin,  2011).
Sadly, only the most notorious cases that captivate the international press 
are prone to draw in any actual penalties. It has even been discussed that 
the  repercussions of  SEA  involving women and  children are  so  small  that
men enter peacekeeping missions as a kind of sexual travel (Aoláin, 2011).
The militarized masculinity theory goes on to convey that sexually abusing
women becomes a method for the soldiers to socially connect and to confirm
their masculinity. These acts can establish a surrounding in which behaviors, 











         
   
   
         




       
         





       
           
 
   






     
  
  
     
      
 
   
  
    
     





    
      
 
  
    
  
The Impact of Gender Mainstreaming on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers
understanding  the  “acceptable”  way  of  acting  in their  surroundings  and
establishing emotional reactions to their encounters (2005). In order to act
in an appropriate way within a cultural standard, one must understand the 
standards by observing and acting within the group (Rubinstein, 2008). For 
instance, Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn, authors of “On The Frontlines: Gender, 
War,  and  Post‐Conflict  Process,”  suggest  that  the kind  of  group  bonding
needed  to create  a unified  and stable military  unit  can  coincide  to  the
proclivity of men inciting other men to do risky actions,  including sexually
abusing women (Aoláin et al, 2011). 
The  United  Nations  Security  Council Resolution  (UNSCR)  1325, 
enacted in 2000, was the earliest pursuit to focus on the problem of sexual
violence and exploitation of women  in war  zones and to demand  for  the 
addition  of women  in peacekeeping operations (Ghimire,  2017).  The 
inclination was  evident  that women are  unjustly harmed by conflict, and 
when women are removed  from  the peacekeeping operations,  the result 




(Ghimire,  2017).  During  the  mission,  Cambodia  experienced extreme
amounts of prostitution, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual assault, and
romantic  relationships  between the host  population  and peacekeepers
(Ghimire, 2017). The peacekeepers  that committed sexual  violence or 
exploitation unfolded the social and familial frameworks for some civilians,
leaving countless Cambodians with the  impression that peacekeepers had














         
   
 
       
     
 
             
         












   
 
   
     
  
 
    
   
 
       
     
     
  
 
   







pointed out that,  in 2010,  female peacekeepers had  increased to 7%, and
female military officers had risen to 2%. During 2012‐2015, 3% in the military
were women and 10% of peacekeepers were women (Pruitt, 2016).  
Expanding the  gender  diversity  and  training in  peacekeeping
operations minimizes  incidents of exploitation, sexual abuse, and violence
against  women  in  war  and  volatile  post‐war  territories  for  at  least  two 
reasons.  First,  the host  population  is  less  probable to  regard  women as 
trespassers or subjugators and they have a civilizing impact, characterizing a
resemblance of a home community with similar norms that could lessen SEA
(Olsson,  L.,  Tryggestad,  T.  L.  eds.,  2001).  Second,  a  peacekeeping  force
comprised of women andmen seems less threatening to the host population
than  just  men.  Under  the prevailing  idea  of  UN gender  mainstreaming,
involving  more  women  in  male‐dominated  missions  enhances  the
appearance of the peacekeeping force within the host population (DeGroot, 
2001). 
The existence of women active in deployed military and police units
creates  proximity to  real life and,  therefore,  decreases  the combative
inclinations  of  peacekeepers  who  may  alternatively  find  themselves 
influenced by the violent, hyper‐masculine essence of post‐conflict volatility
(Carvajal, 2010). Yet, it is not just about adding women into missions. Gender 
mainstreaming must  be  practiced on  the  ground,  and within the  training




       
 
   




















    
 
  


















group  culture with principles  and advocate  a different behavior  from the
common  masculine trend  of  peacekeepers,  the  tactic  might  work  in 
minimizing SEA.  Therefore,  the  hypothesis  is:  The  more  gender
mainstreaming is enforced in a UN peacekeeping operation, the less SEA will 
be executed by the military peacekeeping personnel.  
Methods  




for  results  (George  and  Bennett,  2005).  The  cases  are  selected  using  the
Most  Similar Systems  Design  (MSSD)  (Meckstroth,  1975).  MSSD  means
selecting  cases  that  are  as  similar  as possible  in  all  ways  except  the
independent and dependent variables. Choosing cases by this method allows 





countries (TCCs)  has  its own  culture  and  norms,  which  prompts  to 
contrasting behaviors about women, sex, alcohol, etc.  (Martin, 2005). The 










           
     
 
       
 
 
         
   
               
 
       
           
   
   
       
   
         






   
      
   
 
    
 
 
     
  
        
 
    
      
  
  
    
  
     








in  Liberia  (UNMIL)  and United  Nations  Mission  in Sudan/United  Nations
Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMIS/UNMISS). In this research, 
UNMIS and UNMISS are treated as the same mission because when South
Sudan  acquired  their independence  in  2011,  UNMIS  concluded  and  all 
materials and personnel were moved fromUNMIS to UNMISS (UNMIS 2016). 
UNMIL  and UNMIS/UNMISS  were  selected  based  on  the  variety  of  the 
dependent  variable,  or  the recorded  SEA  accusations  in  each mission.  In 
UNMIL, the recorded SEA accusations have dropped almost every year since
2007. In UNMIS/UNMISS, the recorded accusations have been fluctuating up
and  down and  there is no  indication of  the SEA accusations dropping
regularly (UN Stats 2016). The missions were chosen with some disparities 
in how UNMIL and UNMIS/UNMISS worked with gender mainstreaming to




The  local population of Liberia and Sudan/South Sudan  is another 
distinction. Liberia’s host population is considerably lower than Sudan/South 
Sudan with roughly 30 million more people in South Sudan (UN, 2018). This 









             
       
         
     













         
         
     
 
         
     
 
   
       
    
     
   








    




     
     
   
 
     
  
The Impact of Gender Mainstreaming on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers
chosen since prior years of when the missions were established in 2003 had 
scarce SEA data. 
The dependent variable will be measured as high or low by using the
Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) and their records of SEA accusations. The 
independent variable of this study, gender mainstreaming, will be measured
through gender training before deployment, and gender application during
the  mission.  These distinct  measures  will  display  the variation  in the
independent  variable. Gender  training before  deployment  is  guided  from 
what kind of training the peacekeepers have before the missions. The UN
does not have their own military and are consequently contingent on the
member  nations.  Therefore,  the  member  nations,  also  called  ‘the troop 
contributing  countries’  (TCC),  are  accountable  for  the  training  before
deployment (UN prevention, 2016). Training before deployment is intended
to  give  the peacekeeping  personnel  all  essential  understanding  and 
expertise that is needed to be productive peacekeepers. Gender application 
during the mission involves the training during the missions.  
With  UNSCR  1325  and  the  adoption  of  gender mainstreaming, 
peacekeeping missions have been supplied with gender advisors and gender
divisions. The usual job includes observing gender proportion and supplying
gender training  for mission personnel and  locals during  the mission. They 
also promote conferences and events where local women can get organized
around social movements (Whitworth, 2004). Thus missions that focus on 
gender advisors and/or divisions, along with women in powerful positions,
will  be  examined. With  the  method  of  structured  focused  comparison,  I



















        
   
  
   
  
 
   
 
 
      
 





II. Is gender training operated by  the  mission before deployment?  
What kind of training (discussions/classes)?  






The UNMIL operation  had  evidence of  gender work in the entire
mission, yet, there has been fluctuation as to what degree the work has been
implemented and  how  it  has  been  accepted.  Liberians  have  asserted  a
positive opinion about UNMIL. A common belief is that UNMIL ́s work, which
entailed increasing  knowledge of  gender  issues  and  sexual  abuse,  have 
lowered  the  amount  of  SEA  (Nduka‐Agwu,  2009).  In more  current  years, 




displays  that  the  countries  of  north  Libera  have  more  improved  gender
training more than countries of south Libera, yet, there is a shortage of data






         
         
     
 
         
     
       
 
 












     
     
   
 
     
   
    
 
 












Bangladesh is held by the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation
Training, in which the trainers  recognize every peacekeeping mission and 
order is different. Still, there is no data of any particular gender training for 
the  peacekeepers  (BIPSOT,  2003).  The  Peacekeeping  Training  Cell  in  the
School  of Infantry  and Tactics  operates  the  peacekeeping training in
Pakistan,  yet  training  is  restricted to  military peacekeepers  and mostly 




been  enacted.  In this  manner,  gender  mainstreaming  was  already  an 
integrated approach in all UN peacekeeping missions. In UNMIL, this at least 
produced the addition of an Office of the Gender Advisor (OGA). The OGA
organized  a  required  two‐day  gender‐training  meeting  for  all  arriving 
mission  personnel  (Nduka‐Agwu,  2009).  The  training  presented  ways  to





of  mission  and  during  2008‐2012,  UNMIL  had  a female  as  Special 
Representative of  the  Secretary‐General  (UN 2014). Also, UNMIL was  the


















             
 
   






        
  
 







       
 
  
      
 




were made in SEA prevention training executed by the Conduct of Discipline
Team (CDT) (2012). In the coming years, the in‐mission training persisted to
be included and in 2010 and 2011, more than 5000 personnel had training
each  year  (2012).  To  increase  knowledge  about  the  issue  with  SEA,  the 
gender division in UNMIL had implemented a specific manager training class. 
The  commander’s  accountability for  peacekeeper’s  behavior  had  been 
highlighted, so if allegations of SEA are disclosed and the manager seems to




police  personnel  in  2007‐2015 with  the  topmost  amount  of  SEA  in 2009,
when the mission had 13 SEA allegations. When assessing  the amount of 




data displayed that brutal kinds of SEA had been lowered (Neudorfer, 2015). 





























       








   
 











   
  
    
    
The Impact of Gender Mainstreaming on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers
UNMIS/UNMISS: Independent variable 
UNMIS/UNMISS was initiated  in 2005,  the same year  that  the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations set up the CDT and began to train 
peacekeepers by  the zero‐tolerance policy  (Karim & Beardsley 2016). This
implies that before deployment an in‐mission initiation training was required
for all peacekeeping personnel. Yet, the TCCs were accountable for having 
training  before  deployment  for  military  and  police  peacekeepers  (UN




is  India,  which has  begun to  give tailored  training for  their  female
peacekeepers (UN India 201; UN resources, 2016). Since 2011, UN women in
India  formed  over  20  training  meetings  on  gender  (2013).  The  training
sessions targeted sexual or gendered violence, how to prevent it, and how
to react; however,   India did not have any gender training for men and it is
evident  that  sexual assault  is  not  just  a woman’s  problem  (2013).  Also,
India ́s female peacekeepers only amounted to 1‐3 percent of the force in





training  data in  Sudan  and  South Sudan.  As  reported  by  the UN  Security
council ́s  report  of  the  Secretary‐General  on  South  Sudan, 140  UNMISS 
personnel  had  been trained on  gender  mainstreaming in 2012.  Also, 
























       
 
       
 
   
  
 














    
Katilyn Thomas
which prompted the UN to initiate the UNMISS Child Protection Unit, which
works to defend  children from sexual violence (UNMISS 2016). The Unit is





UNMIS/UNMISS have acquired 29 SEA accusations by military and





year,  the  SEA  accusations  were  fluctuating,  with the  largest  amount  of 
accusations being 7 and the lowest being 1 (UN stats 2016).  In 2007, they 
had  already  questioned  13 peacekeepers  for  offenses  and  4  Bangladeshi 
peacekeepers had been shipped home with related accusations (BCC 2007). 




SEA  that  has  been  perpetuated  by  peacekeepers.  UNMIL and 
UNMIS/UNMISS are  two out of  four UN peacekeeping missions  that have 
had the highest amount of SEA accusations (Inspection, 2015). Analysis of 




         
       
 
               
 
           
 
 
         
       
   
           
         
         










     
    
 
        
 
      
 
 
     
   
  
      
     
     
      
 
   
 
 





a  dropping number of  SEA  allegations during  the time‐period 2007‐2015. 
UNMIS/UNMISS, however, have had a fluctuating amount of SEA during the
same  time‐period.  Additionally,  investigation  revealed  that  UNMIL ́s 
personnel have been entangled in transactional sex with a high amount of
Liberian women. At the same time, UNMIS/UNMISS acquired allegations of 
abusing children with records  of  SEA  accusations of  UNMIS personnel
directly  after  arrival  (FOXNEWS  2007).  Examining  the  results  of  the
independent variable, there is some correlation in how both missions have 
executed work with gender mainstreaming. Both missions were initiated in
the twenty first century when gender mainstreaming and the zero‐tolerance
policy  had  become  an  incorporated  portion  of  a  mission.  Yet, the  data
revealed that UNMIL had a more extensive record of gender training during
the mission  than UNMIS/UNMISS. UNMIL  reacted to  the  issue of  SEA  by
broadening the gender training and adding more personnel. There has been















































       
   
         






















    
  
     




of  gender mainstreaming  on  SEA committed  by peacekeepers.  The  study 
focuses on finding solutions to SEA instead of analyzing the causes of SEA
that has  mainly  been  researched.  The  main  conclusion  of  the  study 
demonstrates that gender mainstreaming has the largest effect on SEA when 
it  is  carried  out  as  gender  training  during  the mission.  The  cases  are 
comparable in  most  features  of  gender  mainstreaming  except for  the 
training that was coordinated during the mission. The evidence displays that 
UNMIL has had more extensive and established gender training during the





host  population.  For  example,  in  Liberia many women were  entangled  in
transactional sex with peacekeepers, so the amount of SEA by peacekeepers 
could be related to women ́s efforts  to enhance  their economic  status.
Another weakness was that gathering data on UNMIL was much easier than 
for UNMIS/UNMISS. The bulk of data for UNMIS/UNMISS was collected by
the  UN,  which  leads  to  a potential  bias  issue.  Clearly,  the  UN  wants  to
illustrate  a positive  image, which  may develop  in  the  record  of  gender
mainstreaming that is fabricated. For further research, it would be beneficial
to advance this study by looking at many cases with contrasting variations in 






























   
 
 
   
 
 











peacekeeping  personnel  and  take action  to  increase  the  attention  and
understanding  about  gender  issues  around  the  globe.  Not  only is  this  a
women’s  issue,  but  also  a  worldwide  issue that  impacts  all  people,
communities, and institutions. We need additional policies that advocate for
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BANGLADESH AND ITS QUEST TO BECOMING A MIDDLE-INCOME 
COUNTRY:  An Evaluation of the Relationship Between Higher Education 
in Women and Economic Development 
Thomas Fratkin, George Washington University
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which higher
education for women influences economic development in Bangladesh.
Two models using OLS regressions were employed to evaluate the
strengths of two critical relationships. The first probed the connection
between higher education in women and the Female Labour Force
Participation Rate (FLFPR), while the second tested the relationship
between higher education in women and GDP per capita. The first key
finding is that there is no statistically significant relationship between
higher education in women and FLFPR. The second main finding is that 
there is a statistically significant relationship between higher education in
women and GDP per capita. The results imply that a good path forward in
Bangladesh’s development may lie in making more concentrated efforts to
strengthen female tertiary education programs. 
Introduction 
At the age of 17, Afroza Khatun did something that girls in Bangladesh
rarely do, refused her marriage proposal.1 Like many girls her age, she had
a strong desire for pursuing higher education, and knew that an early
marriage would make this dream unobtainable. It took courage to resist
the formidable custom and community pressure that is prevalent
throughout Bangladesh. Unfortunately, 75% of girls in Bangladesh are
married before turning 18, and about 33% are married before the age of





   
      
  
     
    
     
  
       
       
 
     
    
       
      
     
   
     
       
    
 
    
           
 
                                                 
  
  
   
   
 
Bangladesh and its Quest to Becoming a Middle-Income Country
15.2 Child marriage is one of the most significant impediments to women 
attaining a higher education. In the case of Afroza, UNICEF and BRAC’s
Adolescent Empowerment Project Program informed her community of the
rights and laws protecting adolescent girls, reminding them that it is illegal
for girls to get married prior to the age of 18.3 As a result of this initiative,
her refusal to being married was accepted by her community, and Afroza
now has the luxury of being able to focus on her studies.
Broadening the scope to Bangladesh as a whole, improving higher
education in women not only benefits the human capital and well-being of
impoverished girls like Afroza, but it also provides dividends for everyone in
the country. For instance, according to the World Bank, “the economic 
returns for higher education graduates are the highest in the entire
education system- an estimated 17 percent increase in earnings as
compared with 10 percent for primary and 7 percent for secondary
education.”4 Furthermore, advancing higher education for women has the
additional benefits of future children having higher quality healthcare and
education, bolstered participation in the labour market, and fewer
children.5 The key question this research paper seeks to answer is: to what
extent does higher education for women influence economic development
in Bangladesh? The main argument is that higher education for women to a
great extent influences economic development in Bangladesh through both 




4 The World Bank, “Higher Education” last modified October 5, 2017.
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Moving forward, this paper will be divided into the following sections:
Literature Review, Data Description for Model 1, Model 1 Econometric
Methodology & Results, Model 2 Econometric Methodology & Results, and
Conclusion. In the Literature Review section, three essential research
papers will be examined, which provide insight on the relationship
between education in women and the female labour force participation
rate. The analysis will build and extend from their findings. In Data
Description for Model 1, important graphs and tables of the data for the
first model will be illustrated, contextualized, and explained. In the
Econometric Methodology sections for both models, the reasoning behind
the parameters of the linear regression analyses will be revealed, and their
two respective research hypotheses that the female labour force
participation rate will be influenced by higher education in women and that
the GDP per capita will be significantly affected by higher education in
women will be analyzed.
In the Results portion of each model, all of the key findings from the
ordinary least squares regression (OLS) tests will be displayed and followed
by an in-depth discussion of their implications and limitations. Finally, in
the Conclusion section, the chief findings of the research and future
avenues of study will be presented, as well as policy recommendations
designed to expedite Bangladesh’s quest to become a middle-income
country. Before moving onto the method and analysis, it is vital to review
the previous literature on women’s education in Bangladesh.
Literature Review 
In Mohammad Hossain and Clement Tisdell’s academic article,




     
     
 
     
    
 
 
    
     
          
      
    
      
      
      
  
      
    
     
        
        
                                                 
   
  
 
           
        
 
  
Bangladesh and its Quest to Becoming a Middle-Income Country
employment, and earnings,” they aimed to assess trends in the status of 
women with regards to a few macro-level indicators, some of which are:
educational attainments, women’s labour force participation, and earnings 
alongside men. When evaluating the correlation between women’s
education and workforce participation, their estimated correlation
coefficients highlighted two key findings. The most pertinent of the two, for
the purpose of this paper, was that there was near perfect correlation
(1.06) between Female-Male Enrollment Ratio (FMER) and Urban Female-
Male Labour Force (FMLFU), indicating a positive association between
closing the gender gap in education and closing the gender gap in labour
force participation.6 Hossain and Tisdell were quick to caution, however,
that the reasons behind this association need further investigation. They
stressed how educational access leading to a convergence in male and
female productivity (according to Human capital theory7) cannot be 
assumed because most formal employment in Bangladesh consists of
unskilled or low-skilled jobs.8 
The most significant result derived from this study, one that pertains
to the topic discussed, is that there is a strong correlation between female
labour force participation and women’s education. That there exists a
strong correlation between higher education in women in Bangladesh and
the female labour force participation rate is of critical interest to the
6 Mohammad A. Hossain and Clement A. Tisdell. “Closing the Gender Gap in Bangladesh: 
Inequality in Education, Employment, and Earnings,” International Journal of Social Economics
32, no. 5 (2005): 450
7 Human capital theory refers to the “aggregate stock of competencies, knowledge, social, and 
personal attributes embodied in the ability to create intrinsic and measurable economic value.” 





   
    
    
     
  
   
     
     
        
  
  
     
   
   
    
      
     
        
       
                                                 
     
       
 
      
        




paper’s investigation. The author’s analysis, presentation of, and cautions
to this finding will be imperative when interpreting the results. In
particular, being mindful of the alternative reasons they proposed to
explain this correlation, reasons such as education serving as a useful
screening device for employers, and increased education leading to a rise in
women’s confidence in pursuing employment, will be of great importance.9 
Further, the women’s rise in high-skilled job participation and the
narrowing of gender earning gaps are both promising signs of progress
being made for women, which can be juxtaposed with Bangladesh’s
progress in development.
In Humaira Husain’s academic paper, “Economic development,
women empowerment, and U shaped labour force function: time series
evidence for Bangladesh,” he provides support for the legitimacy of the
nonlinear quadratic U-shaped function between economic growth and the
female labour force participation rate in Bangladesh over the time period
of 1991-2012. Husain examines the U hypothesis10 by applying both OLS 
and instrumental variable approach to estimate the equation of FLFPR11, 
utilizing two regressors: natural log of per capita real GDP and the square
of natural log of per capita real GDP (per capita real GDP is accepted widely
9 Mohammad A Hossain. and Clement A. Tisdell. “Closing the Gender Gap in Bangladesh: 
Inequality in Education, Employment, and Earnings,” International Journal of Social Economics
32, no. 5 (2005): 450-451
10 The U hypothesis is a “relationship between womens’ educational attainment and advances of
economic development,” where the “declining portion of U is explained by the income effect” 
and the “rising portion of the U is explained by the substitution effect.” For more see Husain
(2016), p. 720. 




      
  
           
    
      
      
      
     
       
 
 
      
     
          
      
     
      
      
     
     
    
   
 
                                                 
     
        
 
  
Bangladesh and its Quest to Becoming a Middle-Income Country
as a proxy for economic growth).12 Husain also incorporates the three 
major GDP sectors as explanatory variables: agriculture, manufacturing, 
and service. The key result found relevant to the hypothesis was that the
estimated coefficient of service value added was found to be both positive 
and statistically significant, indicating that more women are obtaining
white collar jobs in both the public and private sector.13 Husain concluded
that female labour participation accelerated economic growth in
Bangladesh, and recommended giving women better access to high quality
education and more effective job training in order to raise women
empowerment and female labour force participation.
The analysis and results of this article relate to the topic lies within the
finding that female labour force participation has a positive impact on
economic growth in Bangladesh. As higher education for women is one of
the key factors in the female labour force participation rate, it is likely that
higher education for women also has an effect, albeit to a different degree,
on economic growth in Bangladesh. Moreover, the author attributes
women’s advancement above secondary level education to be a possible
cause of more women being absorbed in white collar jobs. This finding is
valuable because it reveals another avenue that can be taken in exploring
the relationship between higher education for women and economic
development: testing the strength of the relationship between women’s
progress above secondary level education and the obtainment of more 
white collar jobs. 
12 Humaira Husain. “Economic Development, Women Empowerment, and U Shaped Labour
Force Function: Time Series Evidence For Bangladesh,” Asian Economic and Financial Review 6,
no. 12 (2016): 721




      
    
   
  
   
    
    
    
  
    
  
  
   
 
        
     
     
    
   
  
     
      
      
                                                 





In Rushidan Rahman and Rizwanul Islam’s working paper, “Female
Labour Force Participation in Bangladesh: Trends, Drivers and Barriers,”
they explore the legitimacy of the hypothesized U-shaped relationship
between economic growth and women’s employment, as well as the 
underpinnings of other drivers and impediments to labour force
participation in Bangladeshi women. One of their chief findings is that
evidence from Bangladesh does not, in fact, support the U-shaped
hypothesis, with a rise in female labour force participation taking place
with accelerated economic growth since the 1990s.14 Another significant
finding uncovered was that the elasticity of employment growth, with
regards to output growth, increased sizably for women in the 2nd half of the
2000s, despite declining for the overall population15. This suggests sizable 
progress has been made for female participation in the labour force and
warrants further inquiry.
Of particular interest in this working paper is its insight on the
relationship between women’s education and the female labour force
participation rate. After performing a logit regression analysis in order to
assess the connection between education and the FLFPR, while controlling
for household assets, they discovered that the four levels of education
(primary, secondary, above secondary, and technical) have gradually
increasing positive coefficients.16 Furthermore, education as a whole had a
positive impact, with the reasoning being that education leads to an
increase in productivity, which thereby raises wages/salary, and then
14 Rushidan I. Rahman and Rizwanul Islam. “Female Labour Force Participation in Bangladesh: 
Trends, Drivers and Barriers,” ILO Asia-Pacific Working Paper Series, (2013): xi
15 Ibid, p. xi.  
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increases FLFPR by its substitution effect.17 The intent of the paper is to
build off in particular Rahman & Islam’s and Hossain & Tisdell’s findings on
the relationship between women education and FLFPR, by honing in on
higher education in particular, evaluating the magnitude of its influence on
not only growth (by using FLFPR as a proxy), but economic development as
well. Before delving into the econometric methodology and the analysis of
the first model, the data that will be utilized must first be described.
Data Description for Model 1 
The data from which the analysis for the first model will be performed
is derived from from two sources. The first provides female educational 
attainment for population aged 15 and over in Bangladesh from the years
1950-2010 in 5 year intervals. This was obtained from the Barro-Lee
Educational Attainment Dataset, which provides data for seven levels of
schooling: no schooling, incomplete primary, complete primary, incomplete
secondary, complete secondary, incomplete tertiary, and complete tertiary.
In addition, it gives the average years of total, primary, secondary, and
tertiary schooling alongside the population of female students in
Bangladesh for each year in the five-year intervals. The data for incomplete
and complete tertiary educational attainment will be of significant value
when evaluating the magnitude of the relationship between higher
education for women and the female labour force participation rate. Below
is a table of the aforementioned data, and on the following page there is a
graph documenting the trends of female educational attainment in
Bangladesh from the time period of 1950-2010:
17 The substitution effect in this context refers to the phenomenon of how “a rise in wage rates
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Table 1: Bangladesh Female Educational Attainment (%, 15+) 1950-
2010
Source: Barro-Lee Version (2.0) 2011.
Source: Barro-Lee Version (2.0) 2011.
In the figure above, a few key trends are worth noting. First, from
Year 6 to Year 13 (1975 to 2010) there was a significant decline (53.7%) in




     
        
   
    
       
       
        
        
   
         
   
 
      
     
       
            
     
       
  
       
       






Bangladesh and its Quest to Becoming a Middle-Income Country
13 (1975-2010) there was a significant incline (>30%) in the percentage of
women with total or completed secondary education level attainment. The
most plausible explanation for such a drastic shift is the procurement of
Bangladesh’s independence in 1971. Third, although difficult to observe
from the scaling of the figure, total and completed tertiary education
attainment increased by 2% and 3% respectively from Year 5 to Year 13
(1970-2010). While this seems quite small when compared to the percent
changes in the secondary and no schooling levels, it is important to note
that for quite some time, zero women had attained higher education. With
total and complete tertiary levels continuously increasing since 1970, this
paper seeks to investigate what impact this specific change has had on
economic development.
The second main resource for the data belongs to the International
Labour Organization database, and was accessed through the World Bank
Databank. They provided estimates for the female and male labour force
participation rate for ages 15 and up in Bangladesh from the years 1960 to
2010. It must be stated that the data provided by ILO is not as complete as
that from Barro-Lee, in that no information was given for the years: 1950,
1955, 1965, and 1970. Therefore, the sample size is considerably smaller,
and this limitation will be evaluated in greater detail during the Results and
Conclusion section. Below is a table with the female and male labour force
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Table 2: Female vs. Male labour force participation rate (% of population,
ages 15+) in Bangladesh 1960-2010
Sources: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour
Market database ISLOSTAT database, World Bank Databank, 2013, 2016. 
Sources: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour
Market database ISLOSTAT database, World Bank Databank, 2013, 2016. 
Two important observations can be made from the figure above. First, 
while the male labour force participation rate has been relatively flat (small
decline) over the course of fifty years, the female labour force participation




      
          
   
  
      
     
      




     
    
  





     
    
     
     
     
Bangladesh and its Quest to Becoming a Middle-Income Country
fold increase between 1985 and 1990. It is also worth noting the 20%
decrease that has occurred in the FLFPR from the time period of 1990 to
2010. In addition, while the MLFPR has always been sizably greater than
the FLFPR, the gap between the two shrank considerably since the 1985-
1990 FLFPR growth spurt. Determining the magnitude to which and
understanding why higher education in women affects the female labour
force participation rate, may help lead to more effective policy measures
being taken to shrink the labour force participation rate gap further in the 
future. Now that we have a clearer picture of the data, the econometric
methodology and analysis can be introduced for the first model.
Econometric Methodology for Model 1 
The research hypothesis being tested in Model 1 is that the female
labour force participation rate will be influenced by higher education in
women. The null hypothesis is that the female labour force participation
rate will not be influenced by higher education in women. The simple
principle model that will be tested is the following:
where FLFPR (the dependent variable) is the female labour force
participation rate (in %), is the FLFPR intercept, (the independent
variable) is total tertiary education for women, is the slope (Beta
coefficient) for , though are the coefficients for the 11 control
variables, and is the residual. The value of is critical, because it will




     
   
       
    
    
    
  
       
     
    
   
      
  
        
     
       
 
   
        
    
    
     
 
Thomas Fratkin
education for women and FLFPR. Dependent upon this value, it can be
extrapolated how significant of a role higher education for women in
Bangladesh plays for determining FLFPR, as well as its potential impact on
economic development. is predicted to be positive ( , based on
the findings and evidence from some of the key literature of the literature
review, which found education for women to have a positive association
and impact on the female labour force participation rate. 
In order to best observe the relationship between FLFPR and higher
education in women given the data described previously, an ordinary least
squares regression test will be performed, with total (incomplete) tertiary
educational attainment as the explanatory variable . All other variables
will be held constant: no schooling, total and complete primary, total and
complete secondary, complete tertiary, population, GDP per capita,
remittance (% of GDP), exports (% of GDP), and export growth. Evaluating
the strength of the relationship can shed insight on whether or not higher
education in women should be more strongly emphasized and targeted in
future policymaking. Furthermore, an ordinary least squares regression was
chosen because the dependent variable, FLFPR, is not a “0/1” indicator
variable; the regressors of total and complete tertiary education are
exogenous and the data is normally distributed. Below is a summary of the
number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and
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As can be observed above, the FLFPR from 1960-2010 in Bangladesh
has quite a large standard deviation compared to the total tertiary variable.
This is not surprising given the sharp rise that occurred in the FLFPR
between 1985 and 1990. From the above summary, it is also clear that the
total tertiary variable has a smaller variance than the FLFPR variable, which
will be something important to keep in mind when analyzing the results of
the OLS regression tests. Now that the econometric methodology and
summary statistics have been articulated, the results of the findings can be
presented and evaluated. 
Results for Model 1 
Below are the results of the OLS regression test performed with FLFPR
as the dependent variable and the total tertiary educational attainment
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Source: STATA, Barro-Lee 2011, ILOSTAT Database, World Bank Databank. 
The first piece of information worth interpreting is the R-squared
value of 0.6124 and the adjusted R-squared value of 0.5571. The R-squared
is a metric that describes how close the data are compared to the fitted 
regression line and can be defined as the percentage of variation in
responses for the dependent variable. In this case, only 61.24% of the
model explains the variability of the response data. It is important to note
the critical limitations of the R-squared metric, which dictate that it cannot 
ascertain whether or not the coefficient predictions and estimates are 
biased. Thus, the 0.6124 result should not be taken at face value. 
Furthermore, given that total tertiary level education and the Female
Labour Force Participation Rate are dealing with human behavior, a high R-
squared value is not to be expected.
The next key result is the Prob > F value of 0.0127. This value is less
than the p-value for total tertiary, 0.013, which suggests that there is not
sufficient evidence that the regression model fits the data better than a
null model with no independent variable. From this, it can be inferred that
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and that the correlation between total tertiary level education and FLFPR is
not statistically significant. Below is a graph depicting the linear regression
for total tertiary vs. FLFPR:
Source: STATA, Barro-Lee 2011, ILOSTAT Database, World Bank Databank.
A third component that must be assessed in order to properly
determine if there is a strong relationship between the total tertiary
explanatory variable and FLFPR are the residual plots. If there are any non-
random patterns in the residual plots, the regression coefficients and
quantitative results cannot be trusted. On the following page is an
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Source: STATA, Barro-Lee 2011, ILOSTAT Database, World Bank Databank.
Inspecting the residual plot closely, we can observe that there is no
clear pattern around zero for the complete range of fitted values. Normally,
from this observation, it can be deduced that the residuals are random in
the regression analysis and that the regression coefficients can be trusted.
However, given the very small sample size, it is difficult to discern the
degree to which the residuals are random. Thus, nothing conclusive
regarding the trustworthiness of the regression coefficients can be drawn.
The fourth result to analyze is the actual regression coefficient value, 
juxtaposed with the p-value. The p-value for this regression is 0.013, which
is smaller than the significance level of 0.05. Typically, from this finding it
would follow that the total tertiary predictor variable is statistically
significant. However, because the Prob > F value is less than the p-value,
we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that total tertiary has no
correlation with the female labour force participation rate. Additionally,
because the regression coefficient is about 14.428, there seems to be a
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increase in the level of total tertiary education, the FLFPR increases by
approximately 14.4%. 
While this overall result is not significant, it is still vital to discuss some
of the serious limitations of this regression test. The largest limitation lies in
the small sample size of the data. Unfortunately, the Female Labour Force
Participation rates for Bangladesh could only be found for nine different 
years that overlap with the data available for trends in total tertiary
education attainment. Thus, even if there was a positive correlation
between the total tertiary level and FLFPR, which there is not, the strength
and magnitude of the relationship could not be calibrated with confidence. 
Another limitation is the inconclusive reading of the residual plot, making it
unknown to what degree and whether or not there is stochastic error. To
gain a better understanding of the influence of higher education in women
on economic development, we must turn to Model 2.
Econometric Methodology for Model 2 
The research hypothesis being tested in Model 2 focuses on how the
GDP per capita (in current US dollars) will be affected by higher education
in women. The null hypothesis is that the GDP per capita will not be
affected by higher education in women. Although economic development
can be measured in a multitude of ways, it was decided that GDP per capita
was the most appropriate metric due to both the density and volatility of
Bangladesh’s population. While the Human Development Index and
Multidimensional Poverty Index take a more holistic approach and can give
a more in depth examination of poverty and economic development, 
adequate amounts of data were not obtained within such measures in
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enrollment per 100,000 inhabitants was found to have the largest quantity
of data available to track changes in higher education levels for women
between 1970 to 2014, it was chosen as the independent variable, after
examining a wide range of women tertiary education indicators (see
appendix). 
Due to GDP per capita being influenced by a variety of factors, it is
critical that a sufficient number of variables are controlled in order to
properly calibrate the degree to which higher education plays a role in
influencing this key metric for economic development. The control
variables selected are: female enrollment in primary education, male
enrollment in primary education, female enrollment in secondary
education, male enrollment in secondary education, male enrollment in
tertiary education, GDP per capita growth, life expectancy at birth,
population, exports (% of GDP), remittances (% of GDP), and export
growth. Below is the regression model that will later be tested:
where (the dependent variable) is the GDP per
capita rate, is the GDPpercapita intercept, (the independent variable)
is female enrollment in tertiary education, is the slope (Beta coefficient)
for , through are the coefficients for the eleven control variables,
and is the residual. The value of is critical because it will indicate the
magnitude of the hypothesized relationship between higher education for
women and GDP per capita. Depending upon this value, the significance of
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development can be extrapolated.  is predicted to be positive, , 
based on the findings and evidence from some of the key literature cited, 
which found that education for women has a positive association and 
impact on economic growth and development.  
Just like the previous model, an OLS regression will again be utilized to 
test this relationship. Below is a summary of the mean, standard deviation, 
minimum, and maximum of the dependent, independent, and control 
variables: 
An important thing to note from the summary above, besides the
wide range in standard deviation, mean, and minimum/maximum, is the
significantly higher number of observations there are for this model
compared to the previous one. As a result of having higher degrees of
freedom, resulting from having a larger sample size, the results from the
ensuing regression analysis will be more statistically significant than the
previous model.18 
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Results for Model 2 
Below are the results of the OLS regression test performed with GDP
per capita as the dependent variable and female tertiary as the explanatory
variable of the model:
Source: STATA, World Bank Education Indicators, World Bank Development
Indicators
The first results that stands out is the R-squared value of 0.9551 and
the adjusted R-squared value of 0.9536. While this 0.9551 value is
extraordinarily high and indicates that 95.51% of the model explains the
variability of the response data, it is inherently limited in that it cannot
distinguish whether or not the coefficient predictions and estimates (in this 
case, the coefficient estimate is about 0.7348) are biased. Therefore, the R-
squared value alone is unable to confirm that this result is statistically
significant. Another important piece of information to interpret is the Prob
> F value of 0. This value is equal to the p-value for female tertiary (0),
indicating the there is adequate evidence that the regression model fits the 
data better than a model with no independent variable. Thus, the model’s
predictions are an improvement from using the mean, and the correlation
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statistically significant. Below is a figure illustrating the linear regression
generated by the model for female tertiary vs. GDP per capita:
Source: STATA, World Bank Education Indicators, World Bank Development
Indicators
The lack of any significant outliers in the previous figure further
supports the fact that the tested relationship is statistically significant.
Another important confirmation that must be made is to see whether or
not there are non-random patterns in the residual plots. If patterns are
determined to be non-random, it can be deduced that the regression
coefficients can be trusted. On the following page is a figure depicting the 
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Source: STATA, World Bank Education Indicators, World Bank Development
Indicators
When examining the above residual plot, there does not appear to be
a clear pattern around zero for the range of fitted values. That being said, 
having 32 observations, while that is a significant improvement from the
number of observations in the previous model, is not enough to draw any
convincing conclusions. The residuals are more random than nonrandom,
but the overall trustworthiness of the regression coefficients cannot be
definitively stated. 
Finally, when comparing the female tertiary coefficient value (0.7348)
to the p-value (0.0), it is clear that the female tertiary predictor variable is
statistically significant. This is due to the p-value being smaller than the
significance level of 0.05. Thus, the null hypothesis that GDP per capita will
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the coefficient value is approximately 0.7348, there does exist a positive
relationship between female tertiary and GDP per capita, and for every 1%
increase in the level of female tertiary enrollment, the GDP per capita
increases by about 0.7348%, assuming, of course, that the residual plot is
random.
Examining the extent to which the female tertiary variable affects GDP
per capita would be incomplete without comparing it to how the control
variables affect GDP per capita. Below is a table that provides the
coefficients, standard error, t-value, p-value, and 95% confidence intervals
for each control variable with respect to the dependent variable:
Source: STATA, World Bank Education Indicators, World Bank Development
Indicators
The only control variables that have a positive relationship with GDP
per capita (like the independent variable, female tertiary) are male
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strong positive relationship between life expectancy at birth and GDP per
capita makes sense intuitively, because if the population in Bangladesh
lives longer, more consumption and production will be take place, which
boosts GDP. While the increase in life expectancy at birth from 1960 to
2016 contributed to an increase in population size (which negatively
impacts GDP per capita), the growth in GDP per capita during this time
period was significantly higher than the growth in population size.19 This 
suggests that the life expectancy at birth variable may have had a stronger
effect on GDP than population size, which further explains its robust
positive relationship with GDP per capita. Similarly, a positive relationship
between exports, as a percentage of GDP, and GDP per capita is logical, as
an increase in exports leads to an increase in GDP, which in turn translates
into a rise in the GDP per capita.
What is surprising to note is how the coefficients for both male
primary and male tertiary are positive, while the coefficient for female
primary is negative. From this finding, a few implications can be derived.
First, female primary education does not appear to contribute to GDP per
capita in Bangladesh.20 Second, both male primary education and male 
tertiary education could have significant positive influences on GDP per
capita. Determining the degree to which these two variables affect GDP per
capita warrants further research with a richer sample size than this study
has access to. In addition, it is important to highlight that the p-values for
the male primary and male tertiary control variables (0.066 and
19 From 1960-2016, GDP per capita in Bangladesh increased approx. 15-fold whereas population
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approximately 0.004 respectively) are greater than the p-value for female
tertiary (0), and likely have a weaker relationship to GDP per capita than
female tertiary education. From this it could be inferred with some
trepidation that future policy should prioritize developing female tertiary
education more than other levels of education.
Before any conclusions can be drawn from these results, some of the
paper’s limitations must be discussed. To begin, using GDP per capita as a
proxy for economic development in Bangladesh is a significant assumption
that is quite contentious. While some positive externalities can result for
the impoverished with a boost in GDP per capita, many of the underlying
root causes that construct poverty traps that are very difficult for the
extreme poor to get out of are not resolved. Other indicators such as the
Human Development Index and Multidimensional Poverty Index tend to
give a more precise picture of economic development by pinpointing
specific areas a country or region may be extraordinarily weak in. As
mentioned previously, one of the main challenges encountered in the
research was finding enough data for these holistic measures in order to
conduct statistically significant tests. Nevertheless, at the end of the
appendix21, two tables that track Bangladesh’s progress in terms of human
development from 1990-2015 and in multidimensional poverty in the years
2004, 2007, and 2011 were included. Interestingly, while Bangladesh’s HDI
has steadily improved in the past two decades, its HDI rankings with
respect to the rest of the world has decreased in recent years. Also, the
country has shown consistent progress in diminishing its MPI for a little less
20 It is important to note that there were only 24 observations for the female primary education
variable, and thus this implication should be refrained from guiding policy decisions. 
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than a decade. If more data became available for future research, it would
be interesting to see to the extent to which higher education in women
influences human development and multidimensional poverty.
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to assess the degree to which higher 
education in women influences economic development in Bangladesh. 
With respect to the first model, from the offset, it had high hopes for 
finding a direct causal relationship between higher education in women 
and the female labour force participation rate, given the promising findings 
in the relevant literature. After performing an OLS regression test on the 
most pertinent data available, the null hypothesis could not be rejected
and the research hypothesis that the Female Labour Force Participation
Rate will be altered by higher education in women could not be 
convincingly supported. For future research, it is recommended that more 
comprehensive data is gathered on the Female Labour Force Participation
Rate in women from the time period of 1950-2010 in order to perform a 
more rigorous statistical analysis from which definitive conclusions can be 
drawn.
With respect to the second model, the research hypothesis that GDP
per capita would be affected by higher education in women, which was
measured by the female tertiary education enrollment indicator, was to
some extent supported. The null hypothesis was satisfactorily rejected, the
residuals appeared to be random, and the R-squared value was an
impressive 0.9551. That being said, it must be noted that the study’s
sample size was still not quite large enough for any conclusions to be made
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research expands the data on female tertiary education levels. Only after
statistically robust analyses can serious policy recommendations be made.
However, the results from the control variables’ coefficients table of the
second model shows promise and indicates that placing more focus on
improving, developing, and accelerating tertiary female education may be
the best path forward. 
Improving access to higher education for women in Bangladesh is 
critical for empowering them to escape formidable poverty traps and live
more enriching lives. The positive externalities that would result from
increasing the female tertiary levels are significant and should be 
prioritized. Higher education for women may be a vital ingredient in
catalyzing Bangladesh’s ascent towards becoming a middle-income
country. This is why it is essential that more scrupulous research in the
future be undertaken to study the relationship between higher education
in women and economic development in Bangladesh. Imagine the progress





     








Table 1: Bangladesh Female vs. Male Gross Enrollment Ratio in Primary &
Secondary Education, and Enrollment Tertiary Education (per 100,000
inhabitants) 1970-2014
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Table 2: Bangladesh GDP per capita, GDP per capita, PPP, and GDP per
capita growth rate, 1960-2016
Year GDP per capita 
(current US$) 
GDP per capita, PPP 
(current int. $) 
GDP per capita growth 
rate (annual %) 
1960 88.7 ~  
1961 97.1 ~ 3.1 
1962 99.6 ~ 2.5 
1963 101.3 ~ -3.3 
1964 99.5 ~ 7.7 
1965 105.8 ~ -1.5 
1966 111.7 ~ -0.7 
1967 121.7 ~ -5.1 
1968 121.5 ~ 6.0 
1969 133.6 ~ -1.7 
1970 138.2 ~ 3.0 
1971 131.8 ~ -7.4 
1972 93.0 ~ -15.5 
1973 117.7 ~ 1.7 
1974 179.0 ~ 7.7 
1975 272.7 ~ -6.0 
1976 138.6 ~ 3.2 
1977 128.8 ~ 0 
1978 172.4 ~ 4.1 
1979 196.4 ~ 1.9 
1980 222.6 ~ -1.9 
1981 241.9 ~ 4.4 
1982 215.4 ~ -0.6 
1983 199.3 ~ 1.1 
1984 208.5 ~ 2.0 
1985 239.0 ~ 0.6 
1986 227.4 ~ 1.4 
1987 247.1 ~ 1.0 
1988 263.2 ~ -0.3 
1989 277.8 ~ 0.2 
1990 297.6 832.4 3.0 
1991 284.7 869.3 1.1 
1992 285.1 916.5 3.1 
1993 291.7 961.2 2.4 
1994 290.7 998.0 1.7 
1995 319.6 1048.2 2.9 
1996 382.9 1092 2.3 
1997 389.5 1136.4 2.3 
1998 395.3 1183.4 3.0 
1999 397.4 1232.4 2.6 
2000 405.6 1301.5 3.3 
2001 402.6 1372.4 3.1 
2002 400.6 1420.4 1.9 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank Databank.
Table 3: Bangladesh GINI Index, 1983-2010




















Table 4: Life Expectancy at Birth and Population, total in Bangladesh 1960-
2016
Year Life Expectancy at Birth (yrs) Population, total (in millions) 
1960 45.83 48.20 
1961 46.46 49.59 
1962 47.08 51.03 
1963 47.69 52.53 
1964 48.25 54.13 
1965 48.68 55.83 
1966 48.89 57.67 
1967 48.83 59.62 
1968 48.53 61.58 
1969 48.05 63.42 
1970 47.52 65.05 
1971 47.14 66.42 
1972 47.03 67.60 
1973 47.29 68.69 
1974 47.93 69.88 
1975 48.87 71.31 
1976 49.98 72.99 
1977 51.10 74.93 
1978 52.08 77.03 
1979 52.88 79.24 
1980 53.48 81.47 
1981 53.92 83.72 
1982 54.29 86.01 
1983 54.68 88.34 
1984 55.10 90.73 
1985 55.58 93.20 
1986 56.11 95.74 
1987 56.66 98.34 
1988 57.23 100.98 
1989 57.81 103.60 
1990 58.41 106.20 
1991 59.04 108.73 
1992 59.71 111.22 
1993 60.41 113.70 
1994 61.13 116.18 
1995 61.87 118.71 
1996 62.61 121.27 
1997 63.34 123.85 
1998 64.04 126.45 
1999 64.70 129.03 
2000 65.33 131.58 
2001 65.90 134.11 
2002 66.45 136.60 
2003 66.97 139.02 
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Table 5: Bangladesh HDI and HDI Ranking, 1990-2015



























Source: Human Development Reports, UNDP.
Table 6: Bangladesh Multidimensional Poverty 2004, 2007, 2011
Year 𝑴𝑷𝑰𝑻 𝑯𝑻(Incidence) 𝑨𝑻(Intensity) 𝑯𝑻
𝑫
(Destitute) 
2004 0.364 67.1 54.3 29.0 
2007 0.306 59.1 51.8 23.1 
2011 0.245 49.6 49.3 17.4 
 










Table 7: Bangladesh Exports, Remittances, & Export Growth 1960-2016
Year Exports (% of GDP) Remittances (% of GDP) Export Growth (%) 
1960 10.0 ~ ~ 
1961 10.78 ~ -11.5 
1962 10.75 ~ 20.8 
1963 9.98 ~ 4.83 
1964 10.03 ~ 3.74 
1965 9.66 ~ -5.19 
1966 10.28 ~ 14.33 
1967 9.31 ~ -11.77 
1968 8.33 ~ 4.00 
1969 8.15 ~ 4.60 
1970 8.31 ~ 10.48 
1971 6.29 ~ -27.62 
1972 5.67 ~ -22.89 
1973 6.54 ~ 85.75 
1974 3.70 ~ -29.44 
1975 2.90 ~ 12.17 
1976 4.75 0.19 24.77 
1977 7.04 0.82 25.45 
1978 5.56 0.87 -7.67 
1979 6.11 1.10 16.5 
1980 5.49 1.87 0.14 
1981 5.13 1.88 -31.77 
1982 5.08 2.84 -4.46 
1983 5.60 3.65 9.24 
1984 3.40 2.65 -0.94 
1985 5.38 2.26 7.90 
1986 5.18 2.65 -1.15 
1987 4.99 3.08 1.90 
1988 5.43 2.87 10.68 
1989 5.54 2.63 8.90 
1990 5.91 2.46 17.79 
1991 6.66 2.49 -3.09 
1992 7.59 2.88 21.85 
1993 9.02 3.04 16.39 
1994 9.00 3.41 3.68 
1995 10.86 3.17 30.72 
1996 9.71 2.90 8.08 
1997 10.52 3.16 14.32 
1998 11.76 3.21 12.27 
1999 11.76 3.52 2.25 
2000 12.34 3.69 14.4 
2001 13.39 3.90 14.9 
2002 12.41 5.22 -0.13 
2003 11.43 5.31 -1.70 







   
 
 



























   
 
Bangladesh and its Quest to Becoming a Middle-Income Country
References  
Becker, Gary. Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with 
Special Reference to Education, 3rd ed. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1993. 
Haq, Naimul. “Afroza’s story: refusing marriage, choosing education” last
modified January, 2010.
Hossain, Mohammad A. and Clement A. Tisdell. “Closing the gender gap in 
Bangladesh: inequality in education, employment, and earnings.”
International Journal of Social Economics 32, no. 5 (2005): 439-453.
Husain, Humaira. “Economic development, women empowerment, and U
shaped labour force function: time series evidence for 
Bangladesh.” Asian Economic and Financial Review 6, no. 12
(2016): 719-728.
Lee, Barro, Lee, Robert, and Jong-Wha Lee. “A New Data Set of Educational 
Attainment in the World, 1950-2010.” Journal of Development 
Economics 104 (2013): 184-198. 
Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, “Global 
Multidimensional Poverty Index Databank” last modified January, 
2017. 
Rahman, Rushidan I. and Rizwanul Islam. “Female labour force
participation in Bangladesh: trends, drivers and barriers.” ILO Asia-
Pacific Working Paper Series, (2013): 32-40.
The Global Economy. “Bangladesh: Exports, percent of GDP.” The World
Bank. Last modified 2017.
The Global Economy. “Bangladesh: Growth of exports.” The World Bank. 
Last modified 2017.
The Global Economy. “Bangladesh: Remittances, percent of GDP.” The
World Bank. Last modified 2017. 
The World Bank, Education Statistics. “Female and Male enrolment in 
primary, secondary, and tertiary.” World Bank Databank. Last
modified 2017. 
The World Bank, International Labour Organization. “Labor force
participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+)
(national estimate).” Key Indicators of the Labour Market database.
Last modified November, 2017.  
The World Bank, International Labour Organization. “Labor force
participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+)













   
 
    
  
 
    
 
 






The World Bank, International Labour Organization. “Labour force 
participation rate, male (% of male population ages 15+) (national 
estimate).” Key Indicators of the Labour Market database. Last
modified November, 2017. 
The World Bank, International Labour Organization. “Labour force 
participation rate, male (% of male population ages 15+) (modeled 
ILO estimate).” ILOSTAT database. Last modified November, 2017. 
The World Bank, Poverty and Equity Database. “GINI Index.” World Bank
Databank. Last modified November, 2010.
The World Bank, World Development Indicators. “GDP per capita (annual 
%).” World Bank Databank. Last modified November, 2016. 
The World Bank, World Development Indicators. “GDP per capita (current 
US $) and GDP per capita, PPP (current international $).” World
Bank Databank. Last modified November, 2016.
The World Bank, World Bank Development Indicators. “Life Expectancy at
birth, total (years).” World Bank Databank. Last modified
November, 2015.
The World Bank, World Bank Development Indicators. “Population, total
(years).” World Bank Databank. Last modified November, 2016. 
The World Bank. “Girls’ Education” last modified September 25, 2017. 
The World Bank. “Higher Education” last modified October 5, 2017.
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports. 
















         
   
             
 







   
 
 
   




   
  
  
   
 
     
  
       
 
         
   
 
 
   
 
 
The Ramerican Political Science Review, Volume 3, 2018 





increase  of  terrorist  attacks  following  9/11.  With  over  385  terrorism 
charges in  the  U.S.  since  2001, these  violent  acts  have  run  rampant
throughout the nation. Media in the form of print/online news, broadcast,
radio,  and  podcasts  plays  a  major  role  in  the  representation  of terrorist




into  creating  a  false  narrative  regarding  these  specific identity
characteristics.  In order to analyze the portrayal of terrorists  in the media
based  on  their  identities,  this  study  conducts  a two‐pronged longitudinal
content  analysis  following  the New  York Times’  coverage  of  ten  terrorist 
attacks occurring in the U.S. post‐9/11. The study’s findings indicate that a 
terrorist’s  identity  is significant  in the framing of said  individual;  terrorists 
who are Muslim and/or of non‐Anglo‐Saxon descent are framed in a more 
politicized  and  racialized manner  than  terrorists  who  are  non‐Muslim
and/or  of  Anglo‐Saxon  descent, who are framed in a more humanized 
manner.
Introduction  
Major  news outlets have a significant  role in shaping the political
reality for individuals. In the United States, news outlets have been part of
the force creating a fabricated connection between Muslims and terrorism,
specifically  since  9/11. The  false  narrative  of  “Islamic  terrorism”  and 
“Islamic extremism” running rampant in the U.S. has risen since the actions
of  al‐Qaeda  in  2001.  Feeding  into  islamophobia,  American  news  media














       













   
     




    
   
 
 
    





   
 
  




A news report from The Nation Institute’s Investigative Fund and The 
Center for  Investigative Reporting’s  Reveal  found the number of terrorist
attacks by  right‐wing  extremists  in  the  U.S.  (2008‐2016)  almost doubled
compared to the amount carried out by extremists associated with Islam1. 
As an  influential  force, news media should provide a voice  for those who 
would  otherwise  be  silenced.  In  the case  of  Muslim  and  foreign‐born
communities,  several major  news outlets  have  done  the opposite  by
spreading  a  rhetoric  rooted  in  hate. Additionally, American news  outlets 
skew the image of the Muslim and immigrant persona by failing to amplify
the  voices  and  concerns  of  these  communities.  Members  of  these
communities should be given ample opportunities to speak for and about
themselves in order to achieve accurate representation, rather than leaving 
the images presented by misguided news commentary to serve as the main
source of representation. 
Since  news  media  have  heavy  influence  over  their  readerships’
perceptions  of  certain  concepts,  people,  and  events,  this  study seeks  to 
explore  the  bias  in  the  portrayal  of  terrorists  on  the  basis  of  identity
characteristics present in news media post‐9/11. For this study, major news
outlets  and media  sources  are  narrowed  down  to  print  news media
specifically; major is defined by the newspaper’s circulation level. Previous
research  has  not  tackled  the  question  of  portrayal  based  on  identity 
characteristics using the comparison of multiple attacks. This study seeks to 
analyze  the  portrayal  of  terrorists  in  print  news media based  on  identity 
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characteristics such as  race, religion, and political ideology. 
Literature Review: Media Framing, Agenda‐Setting,  and  Priming  
Goffman’s  frame  analysis explains  the way  that  individuals  organize
and order their most  salient personal events and experiences.  Individuals
structure  ideas  to  understand  their underlying concepts,  guiding  future
action. 
...definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principals of 





used by media outlets  to  influence audiences. The  information  fed to  the
general public is actively consumed and enforced, therefore allowing media
sources  to have  enormous  power in  controlling  what  people know and
what  conclusions  they  are  able  to  draw  from  the  information  provided. 
When  these  “frames”  address  both  the  diagnosis  and  prognosis  of  a





salience of specific events, experiences, and topics for its audiences by the
way it organizes its public agenda. McCombs and Shaw claim the way news
is  chosen and  displayed  plays  an  important  part  in shaping individuals’
political reality  (1972). Through repetition of certain  ideas, use of specific 
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outlets are able to  influence a readership’s  beliefs  about  certain  groups,
concepts,  and  topics.  News  outlets  most easily  do  so  by  constant 
association of ideas and/or people previously unassociated by readers. The
consistent  association  of  two ideas  with  no  pre‐existing
correlational/causal  relationship,  called priming, is a  key  component  in 
both  agenda‐setting and framing.  Priming is  the association  of  specific 
concepts  together due  to  constant  dual  exposure.  Grounded  in cognitive
psychology  and  rooted specifically within conditioning concepts,  media
priming  is defined by how  the human memory stores an  idea or  concept 
because  of  its  previous  associations.  These associations  are  often 
manipulated  by  news media  through  frames  used  to  portray  individuals,
experiences, and events (Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2012). 
In the case of American media coverage of terrorist attacks occurring 
globally,  priming plays  a  part  in  readership  association  between  the
concepts  of  terrorism  and extremism with  Islam,  Muslims,  and  darker‐
skinned or  foreign‐born  individuals. Combining priming and information 
filtering,  news  editors  decide what will and will not  be included  in  news
articles,  in  turn  determining  what  associations  will  be  formed  between 




these concepts  affect  how audiences  perceive messages  due to both  the
selection of  information provided as well as how  it is presented  (Entman,
2007). 
Critical Race Theory  
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through American news media, providing an explanation as  to how social
institutions, including news outlets, instigate microaggressions as a tool of
oppressing  multicultural and  minority  groups  (Cappiccie,  Chadha,  Lin,  &
Snyder, 2012). Developed by a group of scholars in the 1970s, critical race 
theory  serves  to  provide  a lens  of  ethnicity,  prejudice,  and  structural
inequity through which concepts regarding race and class can be examined 
(Cappiccie,  Chadha,  Lin,  &  Snyder, 2012).  In  the  case  of  media  framing,
framing  components  – specifically  word  choice  and  use  of  stereotypical 
language – if used strategically, have the power to oppress minority groups
existent within a society. In news media, neutral reporting can be plagued 
by the use of harsh verbs and descriptors as well as small remarks playing
on  existent  stereotypes. While  they might  be  potentially unnoticeable  in
singular  instances,  these microaggressions  feed  into  visualizing  a  specific
persona  behind  certain identity  characteristics  (Jeffries,  D. & Jeffries,  R.,
2017). 
Relevant Literature  
A  handful  of  studies  have  considered the  variance  in  framing of
terrorist attacks and their respective perpetrators in Western media due to
the  persona  of  the  perpetrator.  Most, however,  have  been  case  studies
examining  a  specific attack  and  the  news  coverage  following  it. Several
previous  studies examined  the coverage of the terrorist attack by Anders
Breivik  in  Norway,  2011.  Studies  by Berntzen  and  Sandberg  (2014)  and
Falheimer and Olsson (2015) exposed how “lone‐wolf” terrorists need to be
seen as acting from rhetoric embedded in a much larger social movement. 
The  categorization  of  a  terrorist  as  a  “lone‐wolf”  is  detrimental  in 
preventing  similar  acts  in the  future  because  the “lone‐wolf”  narrative 
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Sandberg, 2014). If an actor  is  considered  the odd one  out  of many,  an
entire group’s (i.e. Anglo‐Saxon, non‐Muslim) potential to commit terrorist
acts  is swept under the rug as simply “out of the ordinary.” Berntzen and
Sandberg’s study did not hone in on any specific news outlet or gather data 
specifically  from  certain articles  published  by  a singular  outlet.  Instead,
their case study focused only on Breivik’s attack and provided a structure 
as to how collective action framing played a part  in the news coverage of
his  attack.  Falkheimer  and Olsson  focused  on  Norwegian  news media, 
conducting content analysis  on  924 news articles  from two  major
Norwegian newspapers in the two weeks following Breivik’s attacks (2015). 




the  issue  of  skewed  framing  and  portrayal  in  the U.S. and  Canada  of
terrorism  through  broadcast  coverage,  a  medium form  where  framing,
priming, and agenda‐setting play a major role (Wittebol, 1992). Information 
filtering,  for  individuals,  can  often  times  be  attributed  to  the  content  on 
their nightly news channels.  The capacity of  conducting a study like
Wittebol’s  using  broadcast  sources  is far  more  complex  as  more  factors
play  into portrayal of  certain  individuals over others – amount of  screen‐
time,  use  of  mugshots,  length  of  clips  played/at  what  time,
interviews/soundbites used, etc.  
In  this  paper,  a  comparative  procedure  similar to  that used  by
Schildkraut  and  Muschert in  their  comparison  of  the  effects  of  media
salience in the framing of mass murders in schools (2013) is used. Thus far, 













       
         
       
         
   
   
       
       
   
       
       






       






    
     
    
     
  
  
    
    
  
    
    





Muschert  compare  print  news  coverage  of  two  major  mass  school
shootings. In “Media Salience and the Framing of Mass Murder in Schools: 
A Comparison of  the Columbine and Sandy Hook Massacres,”  Schildkraut
and Muschert address the concept of “issue‐attention cycle.” Proposed by 
Anthony  Downs,  “issue‐attention  cycle”  explains the  process  by  which 
events make their way into the news, gain salience from readership and/or
viewers,  and are  then  replaced by new events and  stories  (1972).  “Issue‐
attention cycle” directly relates  to agenda‐setting, and  is  relevant  for  this
study in terms of assessing headline content as headlines may be more or
less politicized or racialized due to their salience at the current time in the
current media. The experimental design for this study will be grounded in
running content analysis similar to those run by Falkheimer and Olsson. A
comparative procedure similar to that of Schildkraut and Muschert will be
implemented. 
Methods  
To  address  a  question  not  fully answered  by  previous  associated
literature, this study proposes the question: To what extent do major news
outlets in the U.S. construe the portrayal of terrorists based on the identity 
of  the  perpetrator  of  the  attack  post‐9/11?  Previous  research  addressed 
the question  of  skewed  media framing  for  specific  attacks,  yet failed to 
compare  framing between attacks on  the basis of  identity characteristics:
in  this  case,  specifically race  and  religion.  Of interest  is to  explore  and
compare the differences  in  levels of  politicization  and  racialization  of  a
perpetrator’s media framing as per the ethnicity and/or religious affiliation 
of the perpetrator of a terrorist attack. Analyzing the question through the 






         
     
         
         















                                                 
       
   
 
   
  
     
   
     
     
    





   
  
   
    
  




    
  
Saffeya Ahmed
perception of  the concept  of  terrorism  as  a  whole  to  the newspaper’s 
readership.  The  lens  through  which news  media  frame  perpetrators  of
terrorist  attacks based on identity characteristics influences  the  way  the 
American public views these identities. Focusing on The New York Times for 
this study  is pertinent due to  its  influence on the American population as
the  second most  highly  circulated print/online newspaper  in the  nation.2
Additionally, as a paper with a  left‐leaning perspective,  it  is expected that
The New York Times would be less  likely  to  frame perpetrators based on 
their  religious  or  racial  backgrounds  than that  of  a right‐leaning 
counterpart.3
In order to analyze the portrayal of terrorist in the media on the basis 
of  identity, a qualitative  longitudinal content analysis  is conducted on The
New York Times’  immediate coverage of attacks federally  labeled “acts of 
terrorism” post‐9/11. Analyzing  a  total  of ten  attacks  from 2001‐present,
this study surveys the framing of the articles and their respective headlines
published by The New York Times in the 15‐day period following the attack, 
including  the day  of  the  attack.  The  content  analyses  are  run  to  test the 
hypothesis that if a perpetrator of a terror attack is Muslim and/or of non‐
Anglo‐Saxon descent,  the  framing  of  the  perpetrator  will be  more 
politicized  and  racialized  than  if  the  perpetrator  is  non‐Muslim  and/or  of 
Anglo‐Saxon descent.
A total of 107 articles4 and their respective headlines are analyzed and
rated  using  a  five‐point  Likert  Scale  measure  to  survey  the  articles’  and 
2 State of the News Media 2016. (2016). Pew Research Center.  













                                                                                                                  
         
 
 
       
   
       
         
   
   
         
           
     
     
             
     




         
     





           
   
           
         
   









   
       
  
   
   
   
     
 
 
    
  
    
     
  
  
     
      
   
   
       
   
    
   
 
   
     
   
    
  
   
   
   
      
  
      
     
  




   
    
Framing Bias and Identity Characteristics in the Portrayal of Terrorists in American News Media
headlines’  racial  and  political  content  in  regards to  the  framing of  the 
perpetrators of said attacks.5 The five points of the scale include: positive, 
neutral‐positive,  neutral, neutral‐negative,  and  negative.6  The basis  for
rating lies in specific wording, tone,  article structure, use of  stereotypical
language,  re‐emphasis  of  key  ideas  and  identity  characteristics through
repetition,  and  use of  visuals.  Attacks are  chosen  using  a purposive  and 
convenience sampling  method  on  the basis  of  similarities in  attack 
methodology, weaponry,  and  number of  fatalities/casualties.7  All  attacks
4 All articles surveyed are from the News section of The New York Times. Articles cross‐published on the
Times’ website are not surveyed. Similarly, articles from the Opinion, Reader Center, and other Times
sections are not surveyed.
5 The five‐point Likert Scale utilized is based off of that used by Perry in a research study following The
New  York  Times’ coverage  of  pre‐primary  Black  presidential  candidates.  Perry,  R.  (2010).  First
Impressions, “American’s Paper” and Pre‐Primary Black Presidential Candidates: The New York Times
Coverage  of Rev.  Jesse  Jackson  (1983),  Rev.  Al Sharpton  (2003),  and  Sen. Barack Obama  (2007)
Campaign Announcements and Initial Days. Ethnic Studies Review, 33(2), 83‐108.
6 To analyze article and headline content, a five‐point Likert Scale was created where positive, neutral‐
positive,  neutral, neutral‐negative, and negative were  assigned  to  each  article  and  its  respective
headline chosen for the study based on the content coded in each. Positive articles frame the attack’s 
perpetrator in  a  depoliticized manner without  stereotypical  language,  failing  to mention  or focus  on 
race, religion, political ideology, and/or extremist affiliation. Further than purely depoliticized, positive
articles humanize the perpetrator, focusing on details about the perpetrator’s personal life and quality 
characteristics. These articles also use passive verbs and nouns to characterize the attacker and his/her 
actions. Positive articles fail to categorize the attack and its respective perpetrator as an act of terrorism
and  terrorist,  respectively.  If  a visual  is  used,  it  is  a personal  photograph,  rather  than  a mugshot.
Neutral‐  positive articles  depoliticize  the  image  of  the  perpetrator by  focusing  more  on  the  attack
victims.  These  articles  stray  away  from  stereotypical  language  and  use  passive  verbs  and  nouns  to
characterize the attacker and his/her actions. Neutral‐positive articles do not necessarily humanize the 
perpetrator, however do not  focus/reemphasize the  perpetrator’s race,  religion,  political  ideology, 
and/or extremist affiliation as  is relevant. Neutral articles do not attach stereotypical  language to the
identity characteristics mentioned and a mugshot,  if any photo,  is used. Neutral verbs and nouns are
used to characterize the attacker and his/her actions. Neutral‐negative articles frame the perpetrator in
a more politicized and racialized manner than the previous three. These articles focus on and stress the
race,  religion, political  ideology, and extremist  affiliation of  the perpetrator. Neutral‐negative articles
may use slight stereotypical  language  in characterizing the perpetrator. These articles may categorize
the attack and  its respective perpetrator as terrorism & terrorist, respectively. A mug shot  is typically
used, and the articles focuses on the attacker’s motive and method of attack rather than the attacker’s 
personal  life or  the attack victims. Negative articles  frame  the perpetrator in a highly politicized and
racialized manner with a heavy emphasis and focus on race, religion, political ideology, and/or potential
extremist affiliations/tendencies. The content repeatedly uses politically‐ fueled words like “terrorism”, 
“terrorist”, “extremist”, and uses harsher verbs than the previous ratings. Negative articles use a heavy
amount  of  stereotypical  language  and  fail  to  create  any  sort  of humanized  identity  behind  the
perpetrator. Negative articles also see use of a mugshot to visualize the perpetrator. 
7  The  attacks  analyzed  include: 2002  Los  Angeles  International  Airport shooting,  Knoxville  Unitarian 
Universalist  church  shooting  (2008), Wisconsin  Sikh temple  shooting  (2012), 2014 Pennsylvania  State 
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chosen  to  survey  fall  within the  post‐9/11  time  period  and  are federally
labelled  “acts  of  terrorism”  by  the  F.B.I.  or  associated  authorities.8  The
sample of ten attacks is split up into two groups—Group [A] and Group [B]
for comparative analysis purposes.9
Obstacles  for  the current experimental methodology exist within  the
time limitation. This limit specifically leads to a smaller sample size, smaller 
time frame of analysis, and ability to survey content from only one form of
news  media  (i.e. print)  and  one specific  outlet  (the New  York Times). A
separate obstacle exists in the heavy  influence of researcher’s bias as the
researcher  surveys  each  article  and  respective  headline.  The  articles  and






not federally labeled as terrorism or fail to charge the perpetrator with terrorism include: the Knoxville
Unitarian  Universalist  church shooting  (2008) and  the  vehicular attack at  the  2017 United  the  Right
rally.  The  perpetrator  of  the  vehicular  attack  was  formally  charged with  second‐degree murder and
other crimes. Despite these charges, the attack was formally denounced as “domestic terrorism” by the 
current U.S.  Attorney General  and  Justice Department (Myre, G.  (2017). Why  the Government Can’t
Bring Terrorism Charges  in Charlottesville. National Public Radio.) The Knoxville Unitarian Universalist
church shooting falls directly under the federal definition of terrorism. Similarly, the perpetrator’s letter
of motive found after the attack is comparable to that of the manifesto of Anders Breivik, found post‐
terror attacks in Norway, 2011 (Berntzen L. E. & Sandberg, S. (2014). The Collective Nature of Lone Wolf 
Terrorism: Anders Behring  Breivik and  the  Anti‐Islamic Social  Movement. Terrorism and  Political 
Violence, 26, 759‐79.) 
9 Attacks are split up on the basis of the religious affiliation (if known) and ethnicity of the respective
perpetrator  for  comparative  analysis  purposes.  Group  [A]  is  composed  of  attacks committed  by
perpetrators  who are  non‐Muslim  and/or  of  Anglo‐Saxon  descent.  [A]  includes:  Knoxville  Unitarian 
Universalist church shooting, Wisconsin Sikh temple shooting, 2014 Pennsylvania State Police barracks 
attack,  2014  Las  Vegas  shootings, and  United  the  Right  rally.  Group  [B]  is  composed of  attacks
committed by perpetrators who are Muslim and/or of non‐Anglo‐Saxon descent. [B] includes: 2002 Los





       
     
       
 
   











               
   
   
       
 
 
    
   
    
 
  
    
 
   
 
  
   
 
      
 
  
   
        
  
  




In  running content  analysis  on  each  article and respective  headline,
ratings  are  applied with  a focus  on  word  choice –  specifically  verb  and 
descriptor  tone,  use  of stereotypical language, repetition,  and  use  of
visuals.  In  reporting  terrorist  attacks,  print  news  outlets  typically  release
articles to cover the following: a ‘breaking news’ story with the run‐down
of  the  attack including who  was  involved,  attack methodology,  number
killed/injured,  etc.; anywhere  from  one  to  three  profile  stories  on  the 
perpetrator, some assessing attack motive, others focusing on personal life; 
a profile story on the victims and/or victim community; and updates by the 
F.B.I.  and/or  political  officials  later  on  in the  fifteen  days following  the
attack with information about the investigation. 
New York Times Coverage of non‐Muslim/Anglo‐Saxon Perpetrators: Group [A] 




the  articles left  identity  characteristics  out  when  describing  the 
perpetrator, and often times did not mention a name. Typical descriptors
included the presumed age and gender of the perpetrator;  i.e. “a 41‐year 
old man,”  “an Ohio man,”  “a  31‐year  old man,”  etc.  Race  and religion  is
typically  not  mentioned for  the Anglo‐Saxon  perpetrators;  if  either
characteristic is, they are not repeated and emphasized to the extent that
Group [B] sees. Profile articles for Group [A] perpetrators are where most
of  the  positive  ratings  arise.  In  journalism,  profile  stories  are  a type  of
feature  story  which  focus  on  a specific  person. In  the  case of  these














         
   
 



















     
  
 
     
 
  
   
  








temple  shooting  in  2012, the  repeated  character descriptors  throughout 
articles were  “Army  veteran”  and  “rock  singer”  –  misleading  descriptors
when depicting the perpetrator of a terrorist attack. Additionally, personal





so violent. Mr. Page, he said, told him that he had broken up with a 
girlfriend in early June.
In  an  article  addressing  Page’s  ties  to  the  white  supremacist movement,








largely  neutral  language (i.e. “his  beliefs,”  “the  movement,”  etc.) and 
sometimes  positive  language  (i.e.  “white  power,”  insinuating  a  form  of





           
   
       
 
   
       
   
   






       
         








       
 
      
  
    
 
  
    
 
  






    
     




    
 
   
   
    
Framing Bias and Identity Characteristics in the Portrayal of Terrorists in American News Media
Similarly, several articles received neutral‐positive ratings on the basis 
of the articles’ inability to describe the perpetrator as a “terrorist” directly,
using more neutral descriptors  in place. Neutral  terms  such as “suspect,”
“gunman,”  “survivalist,”  “driver,”  and  “man”  were  chosen  as  descriptors
for  the  perpetrators  rather  than  more  politically‐fueled  words such  as
“terrorist” or “extremist.” These passive nouns made a hefty appearance in
headline content, specifically (mentioned below). 
Articles  that  were  not profile  stories  which  used  these types  of 
descriptors  automatically became  neutral  in nature,  and ended up being 
assigned  neutral‐positive  or neutral‐negative  based  on  other  framing
details.  For  example,  in  the  case of  James Alex Fields,  perpetrator  of  the 
vehicular  attack  at  the  Unite  the  Right  rally  in  2017,  word  choice  and
humanizing language played a part  in determining the article’s rating. The
article’s  use  of  humanizing  descriptors  and  inability to  mention  that  the
case was  being investigated  as  an  act  of domestic  terrorism, mentioning
him only as a  “driver,”  creates a less politically and  racially fueled  frame.
Describing him as “a very bright kid,” “quiet  teenager,” and a “very quiet 
little  boy,”  the  article’s  focus  on  Fields’  childhood creates  an  image  of  a
young man whose actions are completely out‐of‐line with what would be
expected.  The  framing  implemented  in  Fields’  case  feeds  into  the  “lone‐
wolf” rhetoric  (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014), pushing  the fact  that despite
ties to right‐wing extremist groups, Fields was a lone actor – disassociated 
from a larger movement from any source. 
Group [A]’s headlines consisted of a great deal of neutral  language – 
often written  in passive  voice –  leading  to positive and neutral  ratings. A
trend  in  headline content  is  the  typical  use  of  neutral  terms in  place  of




       





               
   
           
       
 
 
           
         












    
     




        
  
      
    
 
 
      
     
       
   
 







   
Saffeya Ahmed
“man,” or “driver” were used instead. In several articles, the perpetrator is
not  mentioned  with  a neutral  term  at  all; rather he/she is  completely





and  headlines  analyzed. Key trends in analysis formed in the use  of 
stereotypical language, harsh descriptors, and the repetition and emphasis
on  race and  religion.  Stereotypical language played an influential  role in 
Group [B]’s  ratings. Specific wording and  phrases  included within  articles 
and headlines contributing to existing stereotypes about the perpetrator’s 
religion and/or ethnic background were generally rated neutral‐negative  if
the amount of stereotypical  language was generous;  if it was superfluous
and  combined with harsh  language and politicized/racialized descriptors, 
the rating dropped down  to negative. Opposing the humanizing language
and descriptors generally characterizing most of Group [A]’s profile stories,
Group [B] profile stories emphasized the perpetrator’s roots outside of the












       
     
           
   























    
   
      
  





   




   
  
    
      
 
 
   
 





terrorist  attack  committed  by  Abdulazeez  are  acts  “Americans”  are 
incapable of committing. The association between foreign‐born bodies and 
terrorism  is  primed for  a medium’s  readership  through  descriptors  like
these. This article used stronger verbs and wrote in an active voice rather
than passive  (which several of Group [A]’s articles were written as), using
verbs like “dominated,” “pummeling,” “killed” and “slaughter.” The use of
hard  verbs  and  heavy  stereotypical  language  resulted in  several  of  the
articles for the 2015 Chattanooga shootings receiving negative and neutral‐
negative ratings.  Any  articles in which  the words  “terrorist,”  “terrorism,” 
“extremist”  or  “extremism”  were  used heavily  or  superfluously  received 
negative ratings  due to  how politically‐charged each  of  those words  are; 
contributing to  the association  of certain  groups  with these  politically
charged words. 
The  negative  rating  when  these  politically‐charged  words  are used
superfluously  was  specifically  evident  in  Group  [B]’s  headlines analysis. 
Compared  to Group  [A] headlines, which  leaned  towards neutral nominal
descriptors  for  the  perpetrators,  Group  [B]  headlines saw  “terrorist,”
“terror attack,” or “extremist” mentioned in a hefty number of headlines –
therefore receiving negative ratings. A headline’s word choice plays a large 
role  in  the  framing  of  the  article  as  a  whole  (Jutel,  2016):  the  way  the
article  is  introduced  by  its  title  sets  the  stage  for  how  the  reader  will
approach the article’s content itself (Jutel, 2016). Similarly, headlines serve
as  clickbait.  The more  striking  the wording  used,  the more  circulated  an
article becomes. The more striking the headline is worded, the more salient










       
       
       
       












    
    
    
    
 
  
    









A total of 55 articles and headlines are surveyed for Group [A], while a
total of 52 articles and headlines are surveyed for Group [B]. A majority of
Group [A]’s articles rated either neutral‐ positive (27%) or neutral (29%). A
majority  of Group  [B]’s articles  rated  either negative (40%)  or  neutral‐
10 Appendix available upon request
11 Articles are  left unlabeled (n/a)  if  the content  is relevant coverage of the attack, however does not
mention/is not focused on the perpetrator of the attack. Examples include victim & victim community 


















       
     
       
       










      
  
  
   
  




   
  
    
   
    
    







   
Framing Bias and Identity Characteristics in the Portrayal of Terrorists in American News Media
negative (27%).  For  headline  content,  a  majority  of  Group  [A]’s  article
headlines rated either positive (29%) or neutral (25%); while a majority of 
Group [B]’s article headlines rated either negative (40%) or neutral (35%). 
The  results  indicate  a trend  consistent  with  the  proposed  idea  that
negative framing  is  associated  with individuals  who  are  Muslim  and
typically  foreign‐born. With  forty  percent  negative  ratings  for  attacks
perpetrated by such individuals, the Times’ immediate framing leaned very
politicized and racialized. Compared to the twenty‐nine and twenty‐seven
percent  neutral  and  neutral‐positive article  ratings,  respectively,  and 
twenty‐nine  percent  positive  headline  ratings  for perpetrators  of  the 
opposite  group,  there  is  a  clear  difference in reporting techniques  and 
information filtering used depending on identity characteristics. 
Consistent with  the originally‐proposed hypothesis,  results shift from 
relatively neutral  article content  to highly  negative  content  as  the
perpetrator’s identity shifts. Similarly, a shift from highly positive headlines
to  highly negative  headlines  occurs with  the  same identity  shift.  An
anticipated result of majority positive ratings for Group [A] was disproved 
in  article content;  only  6 articles,  or  eleven  percent, received  positive
ratings.  Notable  in  rating  is  that  the  only  type  of articles  that  received 
positive ratings were profile articles on the perpetrators;  for both groups.
Additionally  notable  is  that  articles which  received  negative  ratings
received headline  ratings  of  the  same.  The  anticipated  result  of majority 
positive ratings  for  Group  [A]  was  proven in  headline  analysis  with  16 
articles, or twenty‐nine percent, rated positive. Group [A] sees a far larger
share  of  neutral  reporting  across  both  analyses  in  comparison  to  Group 





           
   
       
 
 
           
       
 
       
 
   
         
     
 




             
   
                                                 






      
  
    
 
 
      
    
 
    
 
  
     
   
 
    
   
  
 
       
  
    




The implications of research lie in the necessity of eradicating the bias 
in reporting on foreign‐born and Muslim bodies—the skewed portrayal of 
non‐Muslim and Anglo‐Saxon attackers has  left focus off of the right‐wing
extremists.  The  highly politicized  and  racialized  content  features 
throughout  the  reports  regarding attacks by Muslims and/or  foreign‐born
individuals has fed into the stereotype that extremists are only associated
with  Islam. Through the use of priming and agenda‐setting, media outlets
have  provided  a  false  association  of  Muslims  and/or  individuals of  non‐
Anglo‐Saxon descent,  whether terrorists  or  not,  with  the  concepts of
terrorism  and  extremism. Meanwhile,  the  alternate  group  has  become 
associated  with  the  “lone‐wolf”  rhetoric: he/she is  one  actor  of  a  group 
who  could never  come to  represent  the  group  as  a whole. News  outlets
should strive  to neutrally report on every event as it occurs, providing  its 
readership with the most accurate, impartial information as possible. While
all  judgement could not  possibly  be  extracted,  the use  of  specific  verbs,
descriptors,  stereotypical  language,  and  visuals  changes  the  entire  frame 
personifying an  individual. Expansions  of  this  study  could  provide  more
specific evidence  as  to  why  certain  attacks  receive  slanted  coverage
compared to others. 
This study provides a generous amount of room to be expanded upon. 
Confounding variables for  this  study may lie in  the lack  of access  to 
information by reporters assigned stories, other pressing events and news
12 Group [B] result percentages for headline content analyses are of greater value than those of Group
[A]  due  to  the  amount of  unlabeled  (n/a)  headlines  that Group  [A]  received. With  sixteen unlabeled 
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stories  occurring  alongside  the attack, and potentially  the  communities
affected by  the attack. Eliminating and/or accounting  for  these in a study
able  to  focus  solely  on  the  independent  and  dependent  variable  at  hand 
would be most preferred and reliable. Expansions of the research would be
the study conducted without  its main  two obstacles:  time limitations and 
judgement  bias.  This  study  conducted without a time  limitation  would 
provide the ability to sample a  larger number of attacks, potentially more
representative of different ethnic and  religious groups, as well as provide 
the ability to survey articles from a  longer time period post‐attack. Lifting
time restrictions  could also provide the opportunity  to survey article  and 
headline content  through a different news outlet, or multiple outlets and 
compile data from all.  
While it  is not physically possible to eliminate any and all judgement
bias  when  using  a  man‐made  scale  and  allowing human  judgement  to 
analyze content, a way to potentially improve the study would be to allow
multiple individuals to analyze and provide ratings, and/or provide a strict
measurement  scale based  solely  on specific word  choices,  number  of
words, and use of visuals  (measurements that can be strictly enumerated
or answered yes or no) in order to avoid the use of excessive judgement in 
rating. Intriguing for  further  research within the  topic’s bounds would be
exploring the correlation between the identity characteristics of  reporters
with the rating portrayal of attackers. It would also be interesting to survey 
solely  profile  articles  to see  if  the  trend  noticed  in  this  study  does
necessarily exist outside of the scope of this project. 
Conclusion 
The  findings of  this  study are  consistent with  the original hypothesis









       














         








   
  
 
    
    
   
  
 
   
    




     
 
   
   
     
    
 
Saffeya Ahmed
Saxon  descent,  the media  framing of  the  perpetrator  will  be  more 
politicized and racialized than if the perpetrator is not Muslim and/or is of 
Anglo‐Saxon descent.  As  a  highly‐circulated newspaper  with  a  huge
readership,  The New  York  Times  is  influential  in  the  priming  of  readers
through the choice of framing used. After examining the news coverage in 
the fifteen days following ten separate terrorist attacks which occurred  in
the  U.S.  post‐9/11,  it  is clear  there  is a  difference between  the  framing
techniques  The New York  Times  uses  to  cover  perpetrators  of  one
racial/religious  background  in comparison  to  another. The  data  results 
show  that more  politicized  and  racialized  content  in  the  form  of 
stereotypical language, active verbs, and fueled descriptors/visuals appear 
in  articles and  headlines covering  attacks  perpetrated  by individuals who
are Muslim and/or of non‐Anglo‐Saxon descent. The opposite  is found for 
individuals  who  are  non‐Muslim  and/or  of  Anglo‐Saxon  descent,  where
articles  and  headlines  are  flooded  with  humanizing vocabulary, neutral 
descriptors,  passive  verbs,  and positive  images. News media  hold  a  great
deal  of  power  in visualizing  a political reality  for  their readerships.  The
elimination of news slant in the portrayal of terrorist attacks is particularly 
necessary  for  the  mobilization  and  success  of marginalized ethnic and 
religious  groups  who  get  the runt  end  in the  current  reporting style. 
Language, visuals, tone, and other content must be chosen precisely so as
to portray  individuals  in  the  correct  light  as  is  deemed necessary,  and  to 
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THE “DRONE MEMO” AND THE TARGETED KILLING OF ANWAR AL-AULAQI 
Kevin Breiner, Virginia Commonwealth University
Abstract 
In 2011, the Obama administration employed a lethal drone strike against
Anwar al-Aulaqi, both a US citizen and known terrorist. The “drone memo,”
authored by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, seeks to
justify this drone strike as an appropriate use of wartime power by the
Commander-in-Chief. In doing so, the memo distorts the scope of
presidential authority granted by the Constitution and Congress, and
ignores fundamental elements of Constitutional due process guarantees.
To preserve the constitutional integrity of all three branches of the federal
government, judicial review must be made available to the targets of
overwhelming executive power.
Introduction 
While recent presidential administrations have garnered much
criticism for their use of unmanned drones as a means of waging the global
war on terror, perhaps no single incident has become so infamous as the
targeted killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi. In addition to being a senior member of
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), with verifiable links to known
terrorist plots, al-Aulaqi was a US citizen. The Obama administration,
considering him an imminent threat to national security, targeted al-Aulaqi 
in a lethal drone strike in 2011. His death reignited a debate with roots in
the nation’s founding, concerning both the scope of presidential power and
the extent to which the Constitution protects civil liberties in extraordinary
times. The Obama administration, in response to congressional pressure
and litigation brought by the ACLU, released its legal rationale for the strike
in the “drone memo,” a document which justifies the targeting as an
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doing so, the memo distorts the scope of presidential authority granted by
the Constitution and Congress and ignores fundamental elements of
Constitutional due process guarantees.
The President in Foreign Affairs 
Although the framers of the Constitution envisioned a government in
which most power flowed from the legislature, they nonetheless endowed
the chief executive with a great degree of independence and autonomy in
the realm of foreign affairs (O’Brien, 2017). Both Alexander Hamilton and
James Madison acknowledged in The Federalist Papers that, in preserving
national security, the president is not strictly limited to his or her
enumerated Constitutional powers (O’Brien, 2017). Indeed, it is common
practice for Congress, the Supreme Court, and the public to defer to the
president in making decisions that involve international diplomacy or
foreign threats (O’Brien, 2017). 
Illustrative of this trend, the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in US v.
Curtiss-Wright established that Congress did not unconstitutionally
delegate its power by authorizing the president to impose an arms
embargo on Paraguay and Bolivia (1936). The outcome of the case rested
largely on the fact that the federal government was acting in the foreign,
rather than domestic, realm (Curtiss-Wright, 1936). As the executive
branch is the only unified branch of government, the Court determined
that the framers intended it to act as the nation’s sole representative in the
context of international affairs (Curtiss-Wright, 1936). In consideration of
this mindset, the majority concluded that it is appropriate for Congress to
defer to the president concerning matters of national security (Curtiss-
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dominance of executive authority, whenever it is exercised to pursue
foreign policy interests (Curtiss-Wright, 1936).
Further cementing the chief executive’s central role in the conduct of
international relations, the Court, in Dames & Moore v. Regan, ruled that
the president acted appropriately in ordering the termination of all US
court proceedings against the Iranian government, as a means of pursuing
a hostage agreement (1981). After determining that the president had
neither acted with nor against the explicit will of the Constitution or
Congress, the majority turned to the specific facts of the case and
subsequently decided that the president had acted upon an implied grant
of power found in existing law (Dames and Moore, 1981)1. In justifying this
use of executive authority, the Court again upheld the principle that, unless
specifically constrained, the president has substantial discretion in
managing the nation’s relationship with the global community (Dames and
Moore, 1981).
Beyond these traditional exercises of diplomacy, however, one must
also understand presidential power in the context of war. Although the
Constitution divides the power to wage war between the executive and
legislative branches, the president has nonetheless ordered troops abroad
on numerous occasions without explicit Congressional approval (O’Brien,
2017). The Court validates this practice in The Prize Cases, in which it
1 In this case, President Carter acted under the authority of the 
International Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). While Dames & Moore noted
that this act did not explicitly authorize the president to suspend court
claims against another nation, the Court concluded that such an action was





     
   
   
     
    
   
 
 
      
 
     
    
    
   
      
  
   
  
    
     
     
    
                                                 
  




determined that President Lincoln had the authority to enact a blockade on
the ports of rebellious Southern states, even in the absence of a
Congressional declaration of war (1863). Although the Constitution
specifically delegates the power to declare war to the legislative body, the
majority held that the existence of a “state of war,” coupled with implied
Congressional approval2, justified extraordinary measures deemed 
appropriate by the president (Prize Cases, 1863).
Presidential War Powers Curbed by Due Process Guarantees 
However extensive presidential power may be in conducting war or
other foreign policy activities, the Court has acknowledged that such power
still must bend to accommodate certain Constitutional protections
(O’Brien, 2017). Specifically, the conflict between military necessity and
due process rights has been the subject of numerous definitive cases 
(O’Brien, 2017). Historically, the Court has ruled that although war may
dictate a need for expanded presidential power, it does not justify the
elimination of a basic due process framework (O’Brien, 2017).
The Court expresses its willingness to check the president’s wartime
power in Ex Parte Milligan, where it notes that a state of war does not
allow for the circumvention of all traditional due process rights (1866). In
this civil war case, the executive branch used the laws of war to justify the
sentencing of Milligan, a suspected traitor to the Union, by military
commission (Ex Parte Milligan, 1866). As Indiana, the state in which
2 The Court used two statutes, passed in 1795 and 1807, to decide that
Lincoln was acting with Congress’ approval (O’Brien, 2017). These laws
allowed the president to use the military to protect against foreign invasion
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Milligan was apprehended, was not in rebellion against the Union, and as
the federal civil courts remained open, the Court determined that the state
of national emergency was not so great as to warrant the application of
martial law (Ex Parte Milligan, 1866). Even further, the president did not
have the authority to replace civil courts with his own military tribunal in
the absence of Congressional authorization (Tribe & Katyal, p. 1292-1293, 
2002).
Perhaps more relevant to present-day concerns, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
examines due process rights as applied to the global war on terror (2004). 
In this case, the majority determined that Hamdi, a US citizen detained by
government authorities based on his Taliban connections, was entitled to
some means of challenging his confinement (Hamdi, 2004). In its reasoning,
the Court employed Mathews v. Eldridge, which determined that the
extent of due process given is a product of balancing the interests of the
accused against the interests and burdens of the government (1976). This 
balance, in light of the specific case facts, demanded that Hamdi be given
some measure of protection (Hamdi, 2004). In determining the extent of
such protection, the majority turned to Cleveland v. Loudermill (1985),
which stated that one must at least be provided with information
pertaining to the basis of his detention and an opportunity to challenge
those accusations before an impartial audience (Hamdi, 2004). 
Tangentially related, the case of Boumediene v. Bush considers
whether or not suspected terrorists held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have
Constitutional habeas corpus rights (2008). While the government claimed
that such rights were not applicable to those held outside of the United
States, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion made the pointed observation
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thus was limited by the Constitution in its conduct there (Boumediene,
2008). Furthermore, in attempting to replace the habeas rights of the
Guantanamo inmates with the use of tribunals that did not provide a
reasonable and timely review, Congress exceeded its Constitutional
authority (Boumediene, 2008).
Thus, in review of the relevant Supreme Court precedent, it is readily
apparent that the president enjoys immense power during times of war
and in the conduct of foreign affairs. He or she may terminate an entire
class of judicial proceedings to fulfill an agreement with a foreign nation
(Dames & Moore, 1981), or even blockade ports within the US mainland in
times of grave civil unrest (Prize Cases, 1863). Executive power, however,
faces perhaps its most stringent limitations where it conflicts with due
process guarantees. Although the commander in chief may pursue those
who seek to harm national security, he or she may not entirely dispose of
the Constitution’s most fundamental safeguards on the rights of life,
liberty, and property.
Executive Power as Applied by the Drone Memo 
In seeking to resolve the specific dilemma in question, the drone strike
conducted against Anwar al-Aulaqi, the Obama administration leans heavily
on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), passed by
Congress in 2001 (U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ]). Indeed, the AUMF
authorizes the president to take “all necessary and appropriate force”
against those that he or she identifies as having been involved in the 9/11
attacks (Somin, p.2, 2013). This measure, as acknowledged by all three
branches of the federal government, created a state of war between the
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geographical limits on this new conflict (DOJ). The Obama administration
thus claims that its war-making authority extends to any area in which al-
Qaeda or an associated force has a cohesive ability to plot attacks against
the United States (DOJ). The drone memo also highlights the fact that, as
conceded in Hamdi (2004), one’s citizenship may not exclude a participant
in hostile activities from appropriate government retribution (DOJ).
In light of these particular facts, as well as the voluminous body of
Supreme Court precedent establishing executive dominance in foreign
affairs, one may justifiably conclude that the president should be given
wide latitude in targeting enemy combatants. However, the drone memo
fails to acknowledge many key dilemmas stemming from its use of the 
AUMF as a justification for the killing of a U.S. citizen (Fitzpatrick, 2012).
While Curtiss-Wright (1936), Dame & Moore (1981), and The Prize Cases
(1863) all affirmed the authority of the chief executive, each one of these 
cases rested in part on the reasonable assumption that Congress approved
of his or her actions. In particular, Dames & Moore cited Youngstown
(1952) in noting that presidential power was subject to immense scrutiny
when employed against the will of Congress (1981). 
It is, therefore, singularly important that the AUMF specifically avoids
the word “war” and states explicitly that the authorized use of force is
limited to those that were involved in attacks against the United States on
9/11 (Tribe & Katyal, 2002). AQAP, the affiliate of al-Qaeda to which al-
Aulaqi belonged, did not become a major presence until 2009, a full eight
years after these infamous attacks were conducted (Fitzpatrick, 2012).
Furthermore, in Hamlily v. Obama (2009), the DC District Court stated that
AQAP does not qualify as an “associated force” of al-Qaeda, as it is not
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Aulaqi was not intimately associated with any group that implemented the
September 11th attacks, then the language of the AUMF is too narrow to
sanction his death (Fitzpatrick, 2012). Indeed, if the executive was correct
in its assertion that the AUMF applied to any terrorist with remote
connections to al-Qaeda, then presidential authority could be stretched to
unusually expansive proportions, potentially even reaching the streets of
major European or American cities (Flaherty, 2015).
Nonetheless, the Department of Justice seeks to claim further
protections for the president in suggesting that his or her actions regarding
the targeting of suspected citizen-terrorists are exempt from judicial review
(DOJ). Citing Baker v. Carr (1962), the drone memo notes that a judicial 
decision unfavorable to the administration could seriously curtail the
president’s ability to make decisions involving combat with enemy forces,
and therefore diminish powers that the Constitution designated solely to
the executive branch (DOJ). This idea is certainly not without merit; one
District Court judge explains that members of the federal judiciary are not
qualified to make decisions related to the targeting of enemy forces (al-
Aulaqi v. Obama, 2010).
However, while Baker protects the powers of the legislative and
executive branch from inappropriate judicial interference, it also makes
clear that a branch of government may not escape the Court’s judgement
on the sole grounds that a case involves foreign affairs (1962). Rather,
Supreme Court precedent relating to the global war on terror suggests that
this case may present constitutional due process questions that the
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Due Process Debate 
First, the administration correctly acknowledges in its memo that the
due process rights of US citizens apply abroad, as decided in Reid v. Covert3 
(DOJ). It then goes on, however, to argue that they do not necessarily
protect a citizen when he or she engages in the formulation of attacks
against the United States from abroad (DOJ). Using the method of
reasoning found in Hamdi (2004), the drone memo employs the Mathews
(1976) balancing standard, which requires that the government weigh its
own interests and burdens against those of the individual at risk in
determining what constitutes appropriate due process (DOJ). Moreover,
while the Justice Department accepts that no interest is more central to an
individual than his or her life, it claims that the interest of national defense
may prove even more compelling (DOJ). Therefore, if an individual
sufficiently connected to al-Qaeda and suspected of terrorist activity: (1)
presents an imminent threat to national security (2) cannot be captured,
and (3) a drone strike would follow the laws of war, then both the threat
the individual poses and the difficulties involved in applying due process
would justify the lethal use of force (DOJ).
Viewed through such a lens, the targeting of a U.S. citizen linked to al-
Qaeda may appear to be a reasonable compromise between the rights of
an enemy combatant and the great interests and burdens of his
government. However, the Justice Department misapplies the Mathews
3 The Court in Reid v. Covert (1957) found that the trial of a US civilian
by court-martial in a foreign country was an unconstitutional violation of
her due process rights. Importantly, the plurality decision established that 
the United States government is bound by the Constitution in all of its
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standard to this scenario by failing to fully acknowledge a crucial second
part of this controlling majority opinion (Flaherty, 2015; Jaffer, 2016). This
part of the ruling states that the government must also consider the risk of
erroneously depriving one of his or her rights, and the value of additional
safeguards that could mitigate such a risk (Flaherty, 2015; Jaffer, 2016).
The value of measures that could potentially prevent a fatal mistake is
necessarily enormous when one considers the fundamental nature of one’s
right to life and the irreversibility of death (Fitzpatrick, 2012). Further, if
detainees in both Hamdi (2004) and Boumediene (2008) were entitled to
some form of due process in challenging their confinement, then it follows
that those facing the possibility of instantaneous death should receive an
equal or greater amount of constitutional protection (Jaffer, 2016).
Particularly the decision in Boumediene (2008), stating that noncitizen
detainees are entitled to some due process protection, should motivate an
even more scrupulous review of action taken against citizens (Fitzpatrick,
2012).
The executive may respond that the application of additional due
process could impose an intolerable burden on the government’s wartime
operations. However, as the Justice Department already conducts
extensive investigations before targeting any individual in a drone strike,
submitting evidence that is the product of such investigations to judicial
review should not add significantly more friction to the procedures already
in place (Fitzpatrick, 2012). Indeed, as approximately six months elapsed
between the placement of al-Aulaqi on a kill list and the drafting of the
drone memo in 2010, and the lethal strike did not occur for another full
year (in Sept. 2011), it is doubtful that the threat he posed was too urgent
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2017; Jaffer, 2016). It is also worth considering that the decision in
Cleveland (1985) allows for a form of due process that is only procedural, 
and that escapes the complications of a full criminal trial (Fitzpatrick, 2012).
This, and the balancing standard in Mathews (1976), provides for the
possibility of an expedited judicial review that would accommodate the
urgency of compelling government interests (Fitzpatrick, 2012).
Finally, the memo proposes that the inter-executive process which
identifies potential suspects before they are cleared for targeting already
constitutes sufficient due process, and renders judicial review unnecessary
(Fitzpatrick, 2012). However, in claiming that it can provide its own due
process, the executive attempts to establish itself as “judge, jury, and
executioner” (Jaffer, p. 55, 2016). In this new role, the president becomes a
court of his own making, independent of the judicial or legislative branch.
This situation is analogous to two cases. First, the Court in Milligan
(1866) held that the use of military commissions, where they are
unauthorized by Congress, and where civil courts are open, is not
constitutionally permissible (Katyal & Tribe, 2002). Second, the Court in
Hamdan stated that a military commission not authorized by Congress or
the Constitution had unconstitutionally tried Hamdan (2006). Even though
the Obama administration never established a formal tribunal to try those
targeted for strikes, it did create a functionally similar process by which the
executive branch alone defines crimes, decides guilt, and determines a
proportionate sentence, all absent Congressional authorization (Jaffer,
2016). Such a system violates not only decisions made in Milligan and





    
       
  
      
          
      
    
   
      
   
    
      
        
       
     
     
      
    
                                                 
   
     
         
    
  




Recognition of a problem demands a discussion of plausible
solutions. Many scholars have responded to this obligation and generally
proposed two possibilities. The first is before-the-fact judicial review, in
which the government must submit evidence to a court and gain approval
before placing a US citizen on a kill list (Flaherty, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 2012).
This type of review could take place in a court newly created by Congress
or incorporated within existing judicial forums, such as the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court4 (Flaherty, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 2012). The
second possibility is after-the-fact judicial review, in which parties could
challenge the justification for a strike after it has occurred, perhaps to seek
damages for an unjust killing (Jaffer, 2017). 
To begin with before-the-fact judicial review, Flaherty (2015)
makes clear that this method would only be appropriate if the government
was not under immediate pressure to respond to an imminent threat, per
the consideration of government interests in Mathews (1976). In the case
of individuals like al-Aulaki, however, who are placed on a kill list after
extensive interagency debate and not targeted for an indefinite time
afterwards, the government is in no position to claim such imminence
(Flaherty, 2015). Furthermore, while it is unlikely that the government
4 This court (FISC), established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, approves requests by the government to surveil and collect data from
potential terrorists and spies (“What is the FISA Court and why is it so
Secretive,” 2017). Some commentators view the FISC as an appropriate
venue for the approval of drone strikes because it is closed to the public
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could provide the exact form of procedural due process found in Cleveland
(1985), which includes notifying the individual of the charges and providing
them an opportunity to respond, Supreme Court precedent does require
some equivalent procedure (Flaherty, 2015). This should include a court-
appointed representative that may receive and respond to notice of a
potential strike on the targeted individual’s behalf (Flaherty, 2015;
Fitzpatrick, 2012).
In before-the-fact review, the executive branch should be required
to demonstrate that the individual in question presents an imminent
threat, that it is necessary to kill them rather than pursue other defensive
measures, and that capture is infeasible (Fitzpatrick, 2012). These are all
conditions that the drone memo concedes must be met before the
government can conduct a targeted killing (DOJ). Additionally, a court
established to review the placement of an individual on a kill list may bar its
proceedings from the public record to protect state secrets, and may
provide expedited hearings to accommodate the government’s need to
respond to threats in a timely fashion (Fitzpatrick, 2012). Thus, the 
government would not face undue burdens in applying due process based
on time constraints or the need to protect classified information
(Fitzpatrick, 2012; Matthews, 1976).
In some situations, however, the executive branch may need to
respond to immediate threats that do not allow for any time to seek
before-the-fact judicial review (Flaherty, 2015). The drone memo notes
that domestic police officers are entitled to use lethal force if they are
facing the imminent possibility of serious bodily injury and suggests that
the same principle should apply to drone strikes (Jaffer, 2017; DOJ).
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accountable for mistakenly taking a suspect’s life in the context of after-
the-fact judicial review (Jaffer, 2017). Likewise, there must be some judicial
forum in which parties may hold the government accountable for
erroneously targeting an individual in a drone strike (Jaffer, 2017). The
availability, at a minimum, of after-the-fact judicial review would help bind
the government to the rule of law and alleviate concerns regarding the
separation of powers, while also allowing the executive branch to respond
effectively to new threats (Jaffer, 2017).
Conclusion 
A lack of transparency within the executive branch, not uncommon
surrounding sensitive foreign policy issues, complicates the present
discussion (Krishnan, 2013). In opting not to disclose evidence concerning
the targeting of enemies abroad, the government makes it difficult for the
public to determine which of its activities are justified and which are not, or
to apply a consistent standard of accountability to the targeting process
(Krishnan, 2013).
The drone memo, in justifying this lack of accountability, contradicts a
principal central to the nation’s founding – that no branch of government
ought to possess arbitrary or unchecked power. The Obama administration
attempted to wield power of exactly that nature by abusing the AUMF to
expand presidential authority beyond recognized limits, failing to
adequately account for due process concerns, and attempting to change
the very nature of due process by placing its full dispensation in the hands 
of the executive. To preserve the constitutional integrity of all three
branches of the federal government, judicial review must be made
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deleterious  effects  on  those  incarcerated  and  takes  a  toll  on  American
taxpayers. There are significant racial disparities in these rates, as people of 
color constitute over 60% of those incarcerated.  In order to contextualize
this  problem,  sources  such  as  congressional  records,  President  Reagan’s
rhetoric,  statements  from  his  adviser,  data  from  the  National  Household 
Survey  on Drug  Abuse,  search  warrants  for  narcotics,  medical  journals 
comparing  physiological  and  psychological  effects  between crack  and
powder  cocaine,  and  media  coverage  of  the  “crack  epidemic”  were
examined.  These  sources showed  that,  because  of  Congress’s  failure  to
fact‐check the media hysteria regarding crack, law enforcement’s targeting 
of  Blacks  at  higher  rates  than  Whites,  and  the  subtly  racist  political
sentiment apparent during the Reagan presidency,  it seems plausible that 
the  1986 Anti‐Drug  Abuse  Act  was  intentionally  passed  to  target  racial
minorities.
Introduction  
On  October  27th, 1986,  amid  media  frenzy  over  the  “crack 
epidemic,”  President  Ronald  Reagan signed the Anti‐Drug Abuse  Act  of 
1986 into effect (Vagins 2). Only four months earlier,  in June of that year, 
Americans had seen the deaths of two young Black professional athletes—
Len  Bias  and  Don  Rogers—due  to  crack  and  cocaine  overdoses,  leading 
media  coverage of  crack cocaine to skyrocket to  its peak (Reinarman and 
Levine, Crack in America 48). This heightened media coverage resulted in a 
flood  of  widespread  myths  about  crack  cocaine,  namely  that  it  was 
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Mirror 184‐191). Although this was not the first time that the United States 
had  seen  exaggerated  media  coverage of  crack or  cocaine—a New  York
Times article dating back to 1914 claimed that cocaine made Black people
“resistant”  to  gun  bullets—the  media  hysteria  of  the  1960s  was  so 
widespread  that  congressional  records from  1986  show  Congresspeople
quoting  newspaper  articles  to  cite  information  regarding  the  crack 
epidemic (E. Williams; Cong. Rec. 21 Mar. 1986 E 944).  
As  a  part  of  the  “War  on  Drugs,”  the  Anti‐Drug  Abuse  Act
established new mandatory minimum sentences  for possession of various 
drugs,  including  heroin,  cocaine,  freebase  or  crack  cocaine,  PCP,  and 
marijuana. Additionally, the Act created a 100:1 ratio of disparity between 
crack  cocaine  and  powder cocaine—a  person  sentenced  for  possessing  a 
specific  amount  of  crack  cocaine receives  an  equivalent  sentence  to
someone possessing one hundred times more powder cocaine (Nunn 396).
The disparity proves to be problematic as various studies, such as the 1996
study  published  by the Journal  of  American Medical  Association, have 
shown that there are no major physiological or psychological differences in
the effects of powder cocaine versus crack cocaine (Vagins 4).
At  the time of  the  act’s introduction and  subsequent  passage, 
Reagan had just  begun  his  second presidential term,  following his 1984
campaign,  in which he  had  declared “the South  shall rise again,”  a
Confederate slogan. In office, Reagan  condemned busing for  school
integration, opposed affirmative action, and threatened to veto a proposed 
extension  of the Voting Rights Act, all of  which  exemplify the racial 
polarization  that  characterized  his presidency (J.  Williams).  Furthermore, 
Reagan’s use of phrases such as “Chicago welfare queens” and “strapping





         
   
 
       
   
         













       
 
   




     
  
 
    
  
     
      
 
   
  
   
     
 
  
   
   
  
   
  
    
 
  
      
The War on Drugs and the War on Race
racial appeals—that evoke stereotypical images of “a lazy, larcenous Black 
woman  ripping  off society’s  generosity  without  remorse”  and a 
“threatening, physically powerful  Black  man who  defies  White authority
and who lusts for White women” (Haney‐Lopez).
In the four decades since the passage of the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act, 
the United States has seen a 500% increase in its prison population; in fact,
although the United States holds less than 5% of the world’s population, it 
currently makes up almost 25% of the world’s prison population (Brown).
Although crime rates are actually decreasing,  the US continues to lock up
more people than any other nation (Gramlich). This mass incarceration has
been  felt  the strongest  by the Black  community,  as  data  shows  that  not 
only  are  its  members more  likely to  use  crack  cocaine,  while  White 
Americans  are  more  likely  to  use powder  cocaine,  but  also  that law
enforcement  has  targeted Black  Americans  at  a higher rate than Whites
(Benner 109).  
Due to its creation of a 100:1 ratio disparity between crack cocaine
and  powder cocaine, the  Anti‐Drug  Abuse  Act  of  1986  led  to  mass
incarceration  that intentionally and  disproportionately  affected  Black
Americans. Because of Congress’s  failure to fact‐check the media hysteria
regarding crack  cocaine,  law  enforcement officials’  targeting of  Black 
Americans  at higher  rates  than  Whites,  and  the,  at  times,  subtly  racist
political sentiment  apparent  during the  Reagan presidency,  it  seems
plausible  that the  Anti‐Drug  Abuse  Act  of  1986  was  passed  with  the 
intention to target racial minorities. 
Comparing  Physiological Difference between Powder and Crack Cocaine  
Although studies  have  shown  very  minimal  differences  between
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of 1986 created a 100:1 ratio difference between sentencing for the two; a
person sentenced for possessing five grams of crack cocaine receives a five‐
year  sentence,  while  someone  possessing  500  grams  of  powder  cocaine 
receives  that  equivalent  sentence  (Chambers  150;  Nunn  396).  However, 
according to  a study published  by the Journal of the  American Medical
Association  in  1996,  cocaine’s  physiological  and  psychological  effects  are 
similar regardless of whether it is in its powder or crack form. While crack is 
prepared by dissolving and treating powder cocaine with an alkali such as
baking soda,  the  fact  remains  that both are constituted of  the same drug 
(Vagins 4‐5).  Furthermore, writer  Kristin  Zimmerman asserts  that prior  to
the passage of the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act of 1986, powder cocaine and crack 
were “indistinguishable” (4).  
At  the  time  of  the Act’s  passage,  there was  a  popular  belief  that 
crack was so much more addictive than powder cocaine that it was actually
“instantly  addicting”  (Vagins  5).  This  belief  that crack  is  a  different drug 




thus  “yields  a more  intense  rush”  than  snorting  it,  crack  is  not  more
harmful than  powder  cocaine,  as  it  has  the  same  effects on  users, 
according  to  data  provided  by  the  U.S.  Sentencing  Commission (184).  In 
fact, even the negative effects of prenatal crack exposure were identical to 
those of prenatal powder cocaine exposure (U.S. Sentencing Commission E‐
1‐E‐6). Furthermore, according to a written statement by Glen R. Hanson, 
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psychotropic effects once  it reaches the brain, regardless of  its  form (U.S.
Sentencing Commission 17).
Socioeconomic  Differences  in  Users   of   Powder   Cocaine   versus   Users   of  
Crack Cocaine 
Despite  there  being  no  significant difference  between  powder 
cocaine and crack in terms of  their  physiological  effects,  there  is  a major
difference  between  the  users  of  the  two,  as  crack  cocaine  is significantly
cheaper and more accessible to low‐income users (Reinarman and Levine,
Crack  in the Rearview Mirror 184).  In the mid‐1980s, powder cocaine was
usually sold for one hundred dollars per gram while crack was sold in small
rocks  for  five to  ten dollars.  Thus,  while  powder cocaine was  used most
often  among affluent  people,  crack  was  sold  to  a “whole  new  class  of 
people on inner‐city street corners” (184). Furthermore, crack use did not 
expand outside “impoverished inner‐city neighborhoods” due to its intense
high, which is quickly followed by a painful low (187). Since this often leads
to  binging, which many people cannot  regularly participate in  without 
“disrupting their  lives,”  it  is  predominantly those “at  the margins  of
society…people without education, jobs, or life chances, people in pain and
despair” who are more  likely  to use  crack  (188).  Eventually, more people 
began to recognize this, as The New York Times reported in October 1989 
that crack is mainly limited to “poor urban neighborhoods” (188).
Additionally, according  to  law  professor  Kenneth  Nunn,  Black
Americans are more  likely  to use crack, while White drug users are more 
likely  to  use  powder  cocaine.  Based  on  data collected  by  the  Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, while over 18.5 million
White Americans have tried powder cocaine at some time, only 2.8 million 
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Likewise, the data shows that Black Americans use crack cocaine at a higher
rate  than  Whites;  although  214,000 Black  Americans  had  used  crack
cocaine  within  one  month,  only 147,000  White  Americans had  used  it
during  that  same  time period  (Benner 115‐116). Over 1.1 million Whites,
however,  had used powder  cocaine within  that month  (Benner  115‐116). 
Additionally, according  to  nationwide  statistics  obtained  by the  U.S.
Sentencing Commission, Black Americans are more likely to be convicted of
offenses  relating  to  crack  cocaine,  while  Whites  are  more  likely  to be
convicted of  offenses  relating  to powder  cocaine (Vagins  i; Graham 781). 
Overall,  80  to  90%  of  Americans convicted  of  crack  cocaine  offenses  are 
Black,  while 70%  of  those  convicted  of  powder  cocaine  offenses  are 
Caucasian or Latino (Zimmerman 164).  
Thus,  since  there  appears  to  be  no  major  differences  in
physiological or psychological effects between the two forms of cocaine, it 
is  surprising  that  there is  such a severe difference  in  sentencing between 
the  two.  Once  noted  that crack  cocaine  was  available  to  a significantly
different  user  base  than  powder cocaine,  a  possibility  arises  that  the
harsher sentencing for crack cocaine could have been passed to specifically
discriminate  against  its  lower‐income  user  base  consisting  predominantly 
of  Black  Americans.  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  the  socioeconomic
difference in user bases between the two forms of cocaine was known to
the 99th Congress that created the Anti‐Drug Abuse Act of 1986. According
to records from a 1986 Senate hearing, Charles R. Schuster, former director
of  the  National  Institute on  Drug  Abuse,  testifies  that crack  “sells  for  a
lower  unit  price,”  thus  attracting “less  affluent  street  customers”  than 
powder cocaine (Graham 773). Additionally, Senator Leahy from Vermont,













       






         
 
 
         
       








      
   
 
   
    




   
  
     
 
 
     
    









time that  has  passed  since the  passage  of the Anti‐Drug Abuse  Act  of
1986—the United States has seen a 500% increase in its number of inmates
(Brown  and  Patterson).  Therefore,  it  is  plausible  that  these  skyrocketing
incarceration rates resulted from the “War on Drugs,” which brought about 
mandatory minimum drug sentences, life sentences without the possibility





through  2000,  incarcerations  rates  rose  every  year, not  only  tripling  the
prison  population  but  also  giving the United  States the highest
incarceration rate of any modern democracy (Reinarman and Levine, Crack 
in  the  Rearview  Mirror  182).  While  at  the  beginning  of  the  Reagan 
administration,  the  number  of  drug  offenders  was  about  50,000,  by  the
beginning of Bush’s  second administration,  that number had  increased  to 
about  400,000;  it  is important  to note  that  that this population  was
disproportionally  comprised  of  people of  color  who had not  committed
violent crimes (183). 
According  to Jamie  Fellner, who  is the Senior  Adviser  of  the U.S.
Program  of  Human  Rights  Watch,  “drug  felonies are  the  single  most 
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populations.”  In  fact,  Fellner  claims  that  New  York’s  laws  “almost
guarantee” disproportionate sentences  for minor and  low‐level offenders. 
For  example,  an  adult  convicted  of  possession  of  only  four  ounces of
cocaine or selling only two ounces must receive a minimum sentence of 15
years—the maximum is life. Furthermore, for a sale of ten dollars’ worth of 
cocaine, the court must impose a minimum term of one to three years, but 
is  allowed  to  sentence  higher  terms  up  to  25  years  (Fellner).  If this  ten‐




to  the  same sentences”  (Fellner).  Fellner  argues that  there  is no  way  to
justify how an “adult selling a couple of ounces of cocaine to other adults
has  engaged in  conduct  as  harmful or  reprehensible,  for  sentencing 
purposes, as taking the life or violating the physical integrity of another.”
Even  more  alarming  than  this  mass  incarceration  is the  severe
racial disparity in incarceration rates. Of the aforementioned 30,000 people 
in New York who are  indicted for  drug felonies each  year,  approximately
90% are either Black or Hispanic (Fellner). While some may argue that this
is  due  to  a higher  use of  drugs  by  Black  Americans,  various  data 
compilations and studies have proven otherwise. In fact, according to data
compiled in 2003 by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Whites comprise of
7.8%  of  crack  cocaine defendants, while  Black Americans made up more
than  80%.  However,  according  to  the  2004 National  Survey  on  Drug Use
and Health, over 66% of crack cocaine users are White or Hispanic (Vagins
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Stevens notes that despite Whites representing 65% of crack cocaine users,
they make up only 4% of the federal defendants charged with trafficking in




Federal Sentencing Policy that “sentences appear to be harsher and more
severe  for  racial  minorities  as  a  result  of  this  law”  (Nunn  397).
Furthermore,  in  1986,  prior  to  the  establishment  of  federal  mandatory 
minimums for crack cocaine offenses, the average drug sentence for Black 
Americans  across  the nation  was  11%  higher  than  that  for  Whites; 
however, only  four years  later—after  the passage of  the Anti‐Drug Abuse
Act of 1986—that average was 49% higher for Black Americans (Drug Policy
Alliance).  According  to  Brown  and  Patterson,  1 million  of  the  2.3 million 
people incarcerated in the United States are Black. While one in three Black 
men  will  experience  prison,  “White  men’s  risk  is just  6%”  (Brown  and
Patterson).  Overall,  this incarceration  has  detrimental  effects  on
communities and  can  even  impact  political  power.  For  example,  in  34
states, those who are on parole or probation do not have the right to vote. 
Despite  the  severe  impacts  of  the  Anti‐Drug  Abuse  Act  of  1986, 
supporters argue that such severity is necessary, not because it  is the fair 
and moral consequence to a wrongdoing, but rather because it serves as a 
deterrent  for  future drug offenses. However,  this becomes a problematic
argument when it fails to take into account the principle of proportionality, 
which  dictates  that  the  severity  of  a  punishment must  be  fitted  to  the
actions and  consequences of  the  crime. Further,  since  the average minor 
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aforementioned individuals so severely (Fellner). Arguing that “the goal of
deterrence  cannot  override  the imperative  of  proportionality  between
offending  conduct  and  punishment,” Fellner  states  that,  without  the
principle of proportionality, “egregiously punitive sanctions could be placed
on  trivial  offenses,  such as  overtime parking,  and  justified  as effective 
deterrents.”  Therefore,  criminal punishments  must  be reasonable  to  the
weight of the actual crime committed. Similarly, Paul Larkin, writing in the
Harvard  Journal  of Law and  Public  Policy, states that  “the  racial tensions
and distrust generated by refusing to reduce further or eliminate the racial
disparities generated by  that  law might not be worth whatever deterrent 
effect its severe penalties might have” (291).  
In further response to the argument of deterrence, anti‐drug laws 
have not actually shrunk the crack trade, as Larkin argues that new dealers
are  always  willing  to  take the  place  of  anyone  arrested  for  selling  crack
“because  the remote prospect of  future long‐term imprisonment  is not a 
deterrent to someone with no other option” (248). In fact, due to the high
unemployment  and  poverty  in  the inner  cities,  this  mass  incarceration
ended up actually  increasing  the number  of  youth involved  in  the illegal
drug economy (Reinarman and Levine, Crack  in the Rearview Mirror 183). 
Despite imprisonment, hard‐core drug abuse and overdose deaths are not 
decreasing (183).  
If harsh sentences  for crack cocaine offenses have  little deterrent 
impact  and contribute to  the United  States’  alarming level of  mass
incarceration, why have they been tolerated by mainstream politicians for 
so long? One of the possible reasons why such severe and inhumane drug 
sentencing laws have been accepted is because they predominantly impact
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York, people of color represent over 85% of those indicted for drug felonies
and 94% of drug felons sent to prison, while Whites make up just 5.3% of 
New York’s total drug felon population (Fellner). According to Fellner,  the
“predominantly  White  state  legislature”  has  not  been  sensitive  to  the
needs  “of  people  from  communities  different  from  their  own.”  Despite
declaring their concern for the damage drugs cause in communities, “public 
officials  have ignored the hardship to individuals  and  their families  from 
unnecessary years of  imprisonment”  (Fellner). Additionally,  this  raises  the 
question of whether these “deterrent” laws would still be supported if they
were, instead, predominantly impacting White Americans. 
Racial Disparities in Law Enforcement Targeting  
Discrediting the  idea  that  higher  drug  usage rates  by  Black
Americans  leads  to  the  racial  disparity  in  sentencing,  researchers  have 
illustrated  that  law enforcement  actually  targets  Black  Americans  at  a
higher frequency than Whites, augmenting the chances of incarceration for 
that  subgroup  of  the  population.  Law  professor  Laurence  Benner  asserts 
that  members  of  the Black  community in San  Diego  were  vastly 
overrepresented as targets of narcotics search warrants, while Whites were 
significantly underrepresented; although 69‐78% of the population in some
judicial  districts was  comprised of White  people,  81% of  search warrants 
were  issued  to  people  of  color  (109).  Even  though  Whites  made  up 
approximately 55% of San Diego’s population at the time, “less than one in
five narcotics warrants targeted a White resident” (Benner 111). Blacks, on 
the other hand, made up just 9% of  the population, yet were  targeted  in
almost one‐third of the warrants (111). Furthermore, of all the warrants for














       
 














   
  





   
 
    
 














for  39%  of all  narcotic  searches  in San  Diego,  while powder  cocaine 






Clearly, this is not due to a lack of drug use by White Americans, as 
the federal government's 1998 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse
found that 72% of all drug users were White—only 15% were Black. In that 
same  year,  there were  almost  three  times  as many White  cocaine  users
than Black cocaine users. In fact, of the searches that were issued for White 
targets, 53% were successful; however, only 28% of the warrants targeting 
Black  people  were  successful  (Benner 120‐121).  Since  “drug  use  is  not 
exclusive to any racial group,  it might be expected that the race of search
warrant targets would mirror the proportion each racial group represents
in  the population,”  yet  this  “did  not  turn  out to be  the  case”  (110).
According  to  Benner, “drug  users  purchase  drugs  from members  of  their
own  race,”  and  “the overwhelming  majority  of  drug  sellers  are  White,”
which thus implies that “Blacks and Hispanics do not have a monopoly on 
either drug use or drug distribution activities” (112‐113). 
In his examination of  the San Diego  Judicial District, Benner  finds
that “less than 3% of all narcotics warrants targeted a predominantly White
suburban area” (109). In examining three suburban zip codes where Blacks 
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but  one  of  the  warrants  were  for  methamphetamine”  (109).  It  is  worth 
noting  that  this would,  of  course,  be  fair  if  the  drugs were  indeed  being
found  in the predominantly  Black,  inner  city  of San  Diego; however, 




recover the drug sought” (109). On the other hand, “although the number
of warrants  in  the  predominantly White  suburban  area was  too  small  to
make  a  statistical  comparison,  it  was  observed  that  two‐thirds of  these 
warrants  were  successful”  —  all  of  which were  for  methamphetamine
(109).  This  illustrates  law  enforcements’  disportionate  targeting of  Black




against  Black  crack  dealers  in  “predominantly  urban Black  communities,” 
they have neglected to  pursue equally  intensive  enforcement  on
distribution and use of powder cocaine in predominantly White, suburban
areas (247). Across the nation, crack cocaine offenders — who are mainly
Black —  have “consistently”  received  significantly  longer  sentences  than 
those  —  generally  White  Americans  —  serving  for  powder  cocaine
offenses, thus “[producing] a prison population with an exponentially larger
number  of  Black  than White  cocaine trafficking convicts”  (Larkin  247).  In 
conclusion,  “these  aggressive  law enforcement efforts  take advantage  of
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opportunities  available to suburban Whites,  and shunt  [them]  off into 
America’s urban ghettos” (247). 
Political Context  of the Passage of the Act 
In  the months  leading up to the  passage  of  the Anti‐Drug Act  of
1986, the United States saw a wave of media hysteria, resulting in various, 
exaggerated  myths  about  crack,  namely  that  it  made  individuals  more 
prone to violent behavior, was instantly addicting, produced “crack babies” 
when used during pregnancy, and was quickly spreading into all sectors of 
society.  Contrary  to  media claims,  however,  “evidence that  crack  was
neither instantly nor inevitably addicting was available in every government 
survey on drug use that asked about crack from 1987 on” (Reinarman and
Levine,  Crack  in  the  Rearview Mirror  186).  Additionally,  even  in  its  peak
years,  crack was  only  ever  widespread  within the  urban  underclass, 
according to statistics from 1974‐1991 survey data (Chambers 149). 
Contrary  to claims  in  various  media  sources,  such  as  in Time’s 
September 1986  issue,  that  crack  was  “killing  a whole  generation  of
children” data  from a National  Institute on Drug Abuse  survey measuring 
the prevalence of drug use among young people found that “less than 5%
of 18 to 29‐year‐olds in the U.S. have ever tried it, let alone gone on to use 




have not used it in the past month” (186). Furthermore, according to 1991
data  from the  National  Household  Survey  on  Drug Abuse, only 0.4%  of 
respondents between the ages of 12‐17 had reported using cocaine in the

















       
       













   
 
    
  
   
 
  
   
    
    








the age of 35  (Chambers 149).  In  that  same year, only 3% of high  school
seniors  reported  having  ever  tried  crack,  and  from  1974  to  1990,  “the 
percentage of  18‐25‐year‐olds who  had  used cocaine  in  the last 30 days 
never  exceeded  10%” (149).  Additionally,  media  and  politicians 
exaggerated stories  about  crack  babies  without  scientific  reasoning. 
However,  once studies  that  had  larger  samples  and controlled  for 
confounding variables  emerged,  “support  for  the major  claims  of  fetal
‘damage’ either declined or disappeared” (Reinarman and Levine, Crack in
the Rearview Mirror 192). 
Other  examples  of  exaggerated  claims  about  crack  can  even  be 
found  in  the rhetoric  used  by  members  of  the 99th Congress,  which
ultimately  passed  the  Anti‐Drug  Abuse  Act  of  1986.  For  example, media





that crack “probably poses the greatest drug threat to users and society to
date,  because  it  is extremely  addictive,  with  addiction  taking hold even
after a single use” (162). Additionally, crack was referred to as a “plague”
and  a  “scourge,”  especially  by  Senator Byrd  of West  Virginia,  who  “then
commented on the number of deaths due to crack use” (162).  
During  Congressional  hearings  regarding the “crisis  of  the  crack 
epidemic,” Congress asserted that not only was crack more addictive than
powder  cocaine,  but  that  it  produced different,  more  dangerous
physiological effects (Zimmerman 163). Members of Congress also believed 
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therefore led to a higher rate of crime and thus should be punished more 
severely  (163).  However, this  suggests  that  the  politicians oftentimes  did 
not fact‐check the claims they were citing in congressional discussions. For 
example, when voicing his concerns over young people experimenting with 
cocaine  or  crack,  Representative Lee  Hamilton  of  Indiana  prepared  a
statement  to be  inserted in  the  Congressional  Record,  claiming  that  “a
1985  survey  showed  almost  two‐thirds  of  high  school  seniors  had  used
illicit  drugs” (Chambers  171).  However,  Hamilton  had  been  discussing 
cocaine when referencing the 1985 survey, thus implying that two‐thirds of 
school  students had used cocaine (171). This proved  to be misleading, as 
the  survey  simply  referred  to  “illicit drugs,” which may  or may  not have
included cocaine  (171). Chambers  further  notes  that while  1986  surveys
indicated  that  although  “only  12.7%  of  high school  seniors  had  used
cocaine in  the  last  year  and  only slightly  more than 4%  had  used  crack
cocaine, Mr. Hamilton’s” – as well as other politicians’ – “use of illegal drug
use  surveys  indicating that  61%  or  more  of  seniors  had  used  drugs  was
extremely misleading and made it seem that cocaine and crack use among 
children was more prevalent than it was” (171‐172). 






other  have  been  doing  their  job.  They have  been  educating the







































   
 
  
   
   
  
     
  
   
 
   
   
 
 






Since  some of  these  statements by politicians were made as  little as  two 
months  before  the  Anti‐Drug  Abuse  Act  was  passed,  it  seems  Congress
failed  to  double‐check  the  legitimacy  of  media  allegations  before  using 
them for the basis of such an impactful act (Chambers 177‐178).
Another  important  factor  that  may  have  played  a  role  in  the
passage of the act was the death of professional athletes Len Bias and Don
Rogers only four months prior to the Act’s passage. Due to media hysteria 
at  the  time, “Len  Bias  and  Don  Rogers  became  the  faces  of cocaine,  an 
example of  the  tragedy  that  ensues when  drugs,  specifically cocaine  and










Black  people were gaining more political  power  in  the United  States.  For 
legislators  who  either  felt  threatened  by  the increasing  power  for  Black 
people or personally benefited  from racial discrimination, an easy way  to
hinder  the expansion of opportunity for Black people  in the nation would
be  to  pass  an  act  that  has  the  ability  to  bring  about  detrimental  social,
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drug  offenses can  be  considered  felonies  and  therefore,  those  who  are
convicted  of such acts  could  be deprived  of  their  right  to  suffrage.  For 
example,  according  to  the American  Civil  Liberties  Union,  over  200,000 
Black men  in Florida — 31% of all Black men  in  the state — were barred 
from voting during the 2000 Presidential Election because nonviolent drug 
possession  is  counted  as  a felony.  Thus,  for  those  politicians who  were
displeased by the fact that Blacks had recently gained more political power




The  Role of Ronald  Reagan  
According  to award‐winning scholar and  law professor  Ian Haney‐
Lopez, racism was enrooted in the Reagan presidency. In a 1981 interview,
Reagan’s  adviser  Lee  Atwater  states that  the key strategy  to  attracting
White  southern  voters is  by advocating  for policies  in which “Blacks  get 
hurt  worse  than  Whites.”  As  early  as  1966,  during  his  gubernatorial
campaign  in  California,  Reagan  utilized  dog  whistle  politics  when  he
severely  criticized  welfare,  opposed  government  efforts  to  promote 
neighborhood  integration,  and  supported a state ballot  initiative to allow 
racial  discrimination  in  the  housing  market  (Haney‐Lopez).  Furthermore,
Reagan’s race‐baiting continued even when he moved to national politics, 
launching his campaign just outside of Philadelphia, Mississippi, a town that 
was  still  famous  for  the  lynching  of  civil  rights  volunteers  by  the  Ku  Klux
Klan 16 years earlier (Haney‐Lopez). Allegedly, this location was suggested












       








           
           
 
                 
   








   
   
    
    
   
   




   
      
      
 
         
  
     
 
The War on Drugs and the War on Race
when  Reagan  returned  to  Philadelphia,  Mississippi  in  1984,  he  used  the
neo‐Confederate slogan “the South shall rise again” (Haney‐Lopez).  
Furthermore,  according to  Chambers,  in  response  to White
backlash  following  the  1978  California  v.  Bakke Supreme  Court  decision, 
the Reagan administration “not only ceased enforcing all affirmative action 
regulations, but also argued against them in court” (151). Further implying
that Reagan was racist, Chambers cites that not only did Reagan only meet 
once,  briefly, with  the  Congressional  Black  Caucus (CBC)  and  “refuse  to
meet with them  for  the  remainder of his  two  terms,”  it was also “during
Reagan’s administration that the CBC’s funding was challenged, resulting in
the loss of their offices on Capitol Hill and some of their power” (152).   
Haney‐Lopez  argues that  Reagan proclaimed his  racial  appeals 
through criticism  of  welfare,  when he  repeatedly  told  the  story  of  a
“Chicago  welfare  queen”  whom  he  describes by cultivating  the
“stereotypical image of a lazy, larcenous Black woman ripping off society’s
generosity  without  remorse.”  Similarly,  Chambers  reasons  that  by 
propagating the myth of lazy Black women who  live off welfare by often 
referring to them as “welfare queens,” it was easier for Reagan to cut the
social  services  budget  (151).  Through this,  Reagan also  implied  another
stereotype, in which Whites are “the workers,  the taxpayers,  the persons 
playing by the  rules  and struggling to make  ends  meet  while  brazen
minorities  partied  with  their  hard‐earned  tax  dollars”  (Haney‐Lopez). By 
using phrases such as “strapping young buck” – which has been long used
to evoke  the  “threatening  image of  a physically powerful Black man who 
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According  to  Haney‐Lopez,  Reagan’s  racially  coded  rhetoric  and 
strategy  proved  effective  among  voters,  as  34%  of  “Democrats  who 
believed civil rights leaders were pushing too fast” defected from the party
to vote for Reagan. Furthermore, 71% of those who felt “the government 
should  not make  any special  effort  to  help  [Blacks]  because they  should 
help  themselves,”  voted  for  Reagan  (Haney‐Lopez).  Although  some  may
argue that this is because the United States is “historically and at heart” a
conservative  nation,  according  to  statistics  from  2009  survey  data  on
American attitudes towards activist government, the majority of Americans
believe it  is the government’s  role to lend a  helping  hand to its  people,
therefore making  it  a fundamentally  liberal  country  (Haney‐Lopez).  Thus,
Haney‐Lopez suggests, it is the strength of racism, rather than the strength
of conservatism, that allows dog whistlers to gain their victories.  
Additionally, Haney‐Lopez  argues  that  hostility  toward 
government,  oftentimes, is  rooted  in  “racial  narratives  of  freedom  in
jeopardy,”  citing  how  Reagan’s  appointee to  the head  of  the Justice
Department, William  Reynolds,  who  began  highly publicized campaigns
opposing  affirmative  action,  argued  that  “race‐conscious  remedies
amounted to  impermissible  racism against  Whites, intervened in school 
desegregation by encouraging schools challenge court‐ordered integration,
and  defended  school  segregation.”  According  to  Haney‐Lopez,  Reagan’s
campaign  against  affirmative  action was  yet  another  form of  dog whistle


















         
   







           
     
             







       
  
   






     
  
    
  
   
  
   
 
  
     
   
       




Due  to Reagan’s  era  of  tax  and  budget  cuts,  Black  Americans 
suffered more disproportionate income losses than any other population in
the  country (“Falling  Behind”  150‐151,  162).  According  to author  and 
political  science  professor  Clarence  Lusane,  the  drug trade  “provided  the
only glimmer of economic hope” after Black communities were left with a
lack of economic and social resources (49). Since anyone who is willing to 
expose  his  or  herself  to  subsequent  risks  can  participate in the business, 
the drug  trade  is considered by  some  to be  “the most  equal  opportunity 
employer in the world” (87). Therefore, the drug trade can be considered a
threat to  White  supremacy,  as  no  other  job  trades  can  offer  such  a 
“barrier‐free opportunity” for Black Americans (Nunn 422).  
Furthermore,  some  scholars  argue  that  drug‐taking  may  be
valuable  to  marginalized groups,  as  it  symbolizes  their  “defiance  of 
perceived social injustices” (Young 46). According to Nunn, this means drug 
use by people of  color  is an act of  rebellion “against  the authority of  the
White  power structure”  and  therefore threatens  “White  social control”
(418). Thus, it can be seen that by passing such severe anti‐drug laws, not
only did the Reagan administration bring about the mass incarceration of a
large number of Black people,  it  also prevented potential defiance of  the
White power structure. Since cocaine use was associated with Black people 
and  portrayed  as  something  that made  them  “stronger,”  it  was  an  even
further threat to White power and thus had to be immediately stopped.
Furthermore, logically, it made more sense for lawmakers and law 
enforcement to  focus on cocaine. Since crack  is a derivative of cocaine,  if
“cocaine  was the focus  and  had the harsher  penalties,  by stopping or
decreasing the  amount  of  cocaine,  crack would also  be decreased” 















             
       
           
   
   
       
 
   
               
       
       








      




       
    
      
  
  
    
  
        
    
    





But  this  claim  [that crack  was  a  new,  deeply  dangerous
drug] was not based so much on the increased intensity of
this mode of cocaine ingestion as on its new market niche 
among  the  “dangerous  class”  of  impoverished  Black  and 
brown  people.  If  the  crack  scare  really  had  been  about  a
new  and extreme high, then freebasing  and injecting




–  such as  in the claim that  cocaine use  would cause  Black  men  to  rape
women – is similar to the dog‐whistle politics of the Reagan administration, 
in which the rhetoric used by Reagan propagated negative stereotypes of
Black  Americans  and  “provoked  a sense  of  White  victimization” (Haney‐
Lopez). In both cases, there are instances of those with significant political
power – whether Congresspeople or President Reagan, for example – using
racist rhetoric to promote political agendas.  
Overall,  the  mid‐1980s  saw  an  unprecedented  period  of  mass 
hysteria  regarding  the  “crack epidemic,”  in which politicians did not fact‐
check the media’s  exaggerations and myths. Since the planners  and
strategists  behind the Anti‐Drug Abuse  Act  of 1986  most  likely  already 
knew this law would predominantly impact lower‐income, Black Americans,

































Black  communities,  it  is  likely  that  the  Anti‐Drug Abuse  Act  of 1986 was 
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